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SUMMARY
My creative practice addresses two research questions: how does ubiquitous 
computation affect the visual operations of the contemporary control society 
and what does this mean for the use of visual media in contesting such control? 
Through photographic and video work in digital formats, I explore the 
movements and arrests of informatic flows that constitute the operation of 
control, and the potential for resistance that may be felt in the turbulence of 
the interface, as a dynamic threshold where such flows meet. 
In this turn to the interface, I theorise the impacts of computationality on the 
loss of the image as a stable site of representational resistance, with the 
unsettling of perspectival representation in the topology of informational space 
and the ambiguity of a digital visuality whose software hides as it shows. When 
brought together with recent work on the de-materialisation wrought by 
informational Capital, the digital image comes to be seen as an instantiation of 
anxiety about the abstracted nature of power that increasingly operates as 
control. It is less to the digital image itself, but rather to the circulations and 
patternings of data expressed as light on the screen, that we must attend if we 
are to confront the digital visuality of control.
The ‘image-machine of control’ is the infrastructure that modulates these data 
circulations and patternings through inciting the making, sharing and 
watching of images. Drawing on affect theory, I emphasise the role that affects 
of insecurity, at the level of the dividuated subject and the abstracted socius, 
play in inciting an interactivity with the screen on which the State and 
Corporation alike rely for their accumulation and circulation of data. The 
digital-visual interface, being the encounter with the screen, becomes a site-
moment to explore its dynamic boundary condition, whose turbulence of data 
flows may open up ‘lines of flight’ from the striated grid of control. These lines 
of flight help us see beyond the workings of the faciality system, and the 
subject-object relations of the gaze. Specificity of positioning in scopic regimes 
of control still matters, but posthumanist theorising suggests that such 
positioning be understood as vector and not point, whose movements we need 
to stay in touch with. 
Using digital photography to open up the everyday practice of image-making 
to its potential to disrupt the informatic flows of control, my first photographic 
work, medium specific, makes use of photomontage to look at the topology of 
informational space through its ‘folds’, as a first experiment in disrupting the 
tempo of the image-machine’s visual incitements through a ‘pleating’ of its 
data. I use haptic photography in the pieces figure ground, surface gaze and touch 
light to stay in touch with the smooth space of the interface as a time-space of 
contingency, potentially resistant to the gridded striations of control.
My exploration of the contingency of the interface continues with two video 
works, look screen and moving still, which address its vibrational ontology. I put 
the concept of the vibrational interface to use in confronting the rhythms of 
control deployed by the image-machine. Being a rhythm of not only circulation 
but also capture, not merely movement but also arrest, I suggest that 
understanding the ontology of the interface in terms of its vibrational forces is 
useful for disrupting, through its moving stillness, the rhythm of flow and 
stasis on which control depends. Both videos use visual and sonic vibrations to 
set up counter-rhythms and oscillations, whose trembling may release energies 
for change.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The remainder of control
In Tom McCarthy’s (2007) novel Remainder, a man uses the compensation he 
has been awarded after he was injured by a falling object to set about creating 
both a place, and an experience of being in that place, that he recalls from 
before his injury. An event, a sudden sense of déjà vu, triggers a memory of 
this place, a particular building, and sensuous details of his presence and 
movement in it. He recalls this as having been the last time he had a feeling of 
being real, ‘[n]ot awkward, acquired, second-hand, but natural’ (2007, 67). In 
order to recover this feeling, to live again with a directness that, as he puts it, 
cuts ‘out the detour’, he sets about recreating the conditions in which he felt 
this immediacy of being (2007, 198). Through artifice he hopes to recover his 
sense of being natural: simulation is his way back to feeling real. 
What gets in his way is the remainder, the stuff that is outside of control, or 
rather its inside, unseen. ‘My undoing: matter’ says the nameless narrator 
(McCarthy 2007, 17). Escalating in sophistication, he takes his simulations 
outside into real life where he stages a simulated bank hold-up. But, contra 
Baudrillard (1983, 39), the fake turns real, not when the established order, in 
the latter’s phrasing, ‘devour[s] every attempt at simulation’, but when the 
attempt to establish order through simulation is tripped up by its own fantasy 
of control. The enactment of a bank robbery becomes a bank robbery when it 
is bloodied by the unforeseen, that which was overlooked in planning the 
performance, and throughout the novel, the remainder of control is figured as 
a fluid which ‘must have gushed, trickled or dripped onto some surface, 
stained it somehow’ (McCarthy 2007, 198).
I read Remainder as an invitation to think and play with the limits of control, its 
outside that is folded inside, and what that might look and feel like. The vivid 
tactility of McCarthy’s bloody remainder struck me, or better, stained my 
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thinking about resistance to control. At the time I came across the book, I was 
involved with activism on male supremacy and men’s violence, understanding 
them as practices of control based on logics of exploitation and domination. 
From the escalation of US military interventions in the aftermath of the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, through to the politics of austerity (Edsall 2011) in the 
wake of the financial crash of 2008, such logics have seemed impervious to 
challenge, let alone change. 
Ritualised attendance at large scale public demonstrations with no discernible 
impact only fuelled my sense of futility about efforts to confront these realities 
of exploitation and domination. Occupy Wall St (OWS) made visible new 
political spaces in an ever more managed and monitored agora, yet its neo-
Situationist commitment to the event rather than struggle, and its horizontalist 
suspicion of leadership and structure, undermined its ability to hold let alone 
expand such spaces (Watkins 2016). In my own activist work, two completed 
rounds of a consciousness raising group for male activists on challenging male 
supremacy left me aware of how hard it is to get to what I thought of as deeper 
levels of change.
In one reading Remainder is a story about trauma, and the bizarre lengths the 
narrator/survivor goes to after his accident so that he may heal his damaged 
psyche and recover his natural self. In another, it’s an allegory of contemporary 
life and its hyper-mediated narcissism, describing the narrator/survivor’s 
relentless quest for a natural authenticity that can only be experienced through 
a series of ever more elaborate stage-managed (re)enactments, film sets with 
multiple takes but no camera equipment. McCarthy, however, does not seem 
interested in either psychology or sociology, the twin poles of what might be 
termed humanist thinking on social change between which I had oriented 
myself. He prefers topography. The nameless narrator has no past to speak of 
and no interest in the present outside of that which he can control. The book 
has little interest in psychological or sociological context or depth.  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But it is fascinated by spaces and surfaces and movements in and across them, 
and what happens when we try to control these patterns in pursuit of not 
‘being separate, removed, imperfect’ (McCarthy 2007, 198). With this 
attention to the remainder, I could begin to see beyond the impasse of futility. 
The concentration on surface, movement and pattern gave me other ways to 
think about the use of the visual in challenging operations of social control. 
Hitherto, my experience with using visual media in projects of social change 
had been restricted to documenting struggles through photography and video, 
and using digital storytelling to narrate personal stories of change. These 
narrative and documentary modes felt, and still feel, important. But I came to 
sense the confinement of such modes within their logic of transformation 
through revelation; very little seemed to gush, trickle or drip. They were too 
neat. I wanted to use video and photography as an oppositional practice 
because social life and social control are more than ever matters of visuality, 
from Instagrammed living to the ‘actuarial gaze’ of dataveillance regimes of 
power (Feldman 2013; Mirzoeff 2013). But the use of visual media simply to 
expose these visual operations of control seemed inadequate, not least because 
exposure was itself their logic of operation. I became interested in a practice of 
visual media that was itself less sealed within an oppositional message about, 
or image of, social control, a practice that instead might leak and stain.
My interest in the remainder, then, is the attention it draws to the virtual in the 
sense that Massumi defines it, as contributing ‘to a pragmatic understanding of 
emergence’ which can ‘enable triggerings of change’ (1995, 105). As he 
(Massumi 1995, 105) says, ‘[i]t is the edge of virtual, where it leaks into actual, 
that counts. For that seeping edge is where potential, actually, is found.’ This 
trope of fluidity is significant because the cybernetic theorising of control in 
unstable systems on which Deleuze (1995b) drew in his discussion of 
contemporary control societies was itself grounded in work on fluid dynamics 
and feedback mechanisms from the nineteenth century (Hookway 2014) .  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If the control society, in this era of ubiquitous computation, operates through 
channeling and modulating data flows, as Deleuze suggests, my visual practice 
has been concerned with exploring its seeping edges.
1.2 Working with the remainder
Two broad research questions have structured my creative practice: how does 
ubiquitous computation affect the visual operations of the contemporary 
control society and what does this mean for the use of visual media in 
contesting such control? To answer these questions, I have turned to digital 
photography and video, visual media that Munster (2006, 164) characterises as 
the ‘older practices of new media’. Reflecting on my own experience and 
dissatisfaction with the expository use of such practices in political struggle 
and social protest, I was interested in finding new uses for this ‘older’ media. 
If, as Mirzoeff (2016, 13) suggests, ‘[v]isual culture is something we engage in 
as an active way to create change, not just a way to see what is happening’, my 
creative practice has explored the use of photography and video not to see and 
show what is happening with social control, but to experience the flows, leaks 
and stains of its visual operations. In this manner, I have sought an ‘active way 
to create change’ through sensing the ‘seeping edges’ of computational 
visuality, the potential for emergence of something new at ‘the edge of virtual, 
where it leaks into actual’. 
Using the ‘older practices’ of photography and video is also a way to engage 
with the temporal lags and differentials characterising the digital mediascape 
of informational capitalism (Smart 2000; Castells 2009; Fuchs 2009). As 
Munster (2006, 164) explains, this  is about the ‘lag between “cutting-edge” 
digital art and the critically reflexive practices of technologically outmoded 
new media art’. As she (Munster 2006, 164) suggests ‘the place where 
electronic art and the postcolonial impulse have met lies with forms such as 
digital photomedia and video […].’ These are the ‘digital art practices that 
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[can] undermine, parody and forcibly differentiate the smooth flows of global 
speed along a meridian of new vectors and [keep] them open to 
contestation’ (Munster 2006, 171).
Based in arguably the metropolitan centre of global capitalism, New York City, 
I was interested in how such lags might be explored and experienced, not from 
the periphery, but from this centre. I was curious about the ways in which 
photography and video in and of New York could play with and contest the 
‘smooth flows of global speed’, disrupting their tempo, inciting turbulence. 
This is to say that the siting of my work in New York is not specifically about 
the city as a space of digital visuality, taken up in the growing literature on 
urban screens (Cubitt 2009; McQuire et al. 2009; Nevárez 2009). Nor is my 
work a particular response to the ‘surveillant assemblage’ of the 21st century 
city (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) and the interest in the urban as the locus of 
resistance to the depredations of capitalism (Merrifield 2002; Harvey 2012).
While I do touch on both urban screens and panoptical surveillance, my visual 
practice has been concerned primarily with moments of immersion within the 
informational circuits, manifested as images, that course through the city, and 
what might emerge from such moments as a sense of other flows, new vectors. 
This is an immersion in the ‘everyday’ of computational visuality. It is still the 
case that people’s everyday experience of the impact of ubiquitous 
computation on visual experience, as not only consumers but also producers, 
remains dominated by the image, both still and moving. If ‘reality now widely 
consists of images; or rather, of things, constellations, and processes formerly 
evident as images’, as Steyerl (2014, 35) suggests, then this ‘means one cannot 
understand reality without understanding cinema, photography […] or other 
forms of moving or still image.’ In this sense, my use of photography and 
videography is an ‘everyday’ practice of digital media making, a deployment of 
the kind of ‘everyday’ practices invoked by de Certeau (1984) among others 
(Lefebvre 1991; Benjamin 1999) as a tactics of resistance. 
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Highmore (2002, 151) makes clear that ‘[r]esistance in de Certeau is closer to 
the use of the term in electronics and psychoanalysis: it is what hinders and 
dissipates the energy flow of domination, it is what resists representation.’ This 
speaks well to the impulse behind my use of still and moving images to disrupt 
and deform the informational flows of control, through exploring the creative 
use of the quotidian vernacular of the digital visual as an everyday mode of 
resistance.
But amid ubiquitous computation, and the immersive visuality this makes 
possible, there is no ‘obvious exterior place or space of ethical and political 
opposition’ (Kember 2012) for an ‘everyday’ tactics of visual resistance, such 
as I am invoking above, to occupy. Instead, as Kember (2012) suggests, 
referencing the work of Crang and Graham (2007, 814) on the urban politics 
of ambient algorithmic control, the task for the ‘becoming-photographer in 
technoculture’ is to ‘work through the inevitable granularity and gaps within 
these systems, to find the new shadows and opacities that they produce.’ 
I see this as a kind of minoritarian visual practice, taking inspiration from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986) discussion of a minor literature, which Bleyen 
(2012, ix) defines as writing that ‘deterritorializes the dominant use of a 
language, makes it stutter and stammer’ by ‘moving language to the borders of 
its representational level, towards music or silence.’ I, too, have been interested 
in the borders of representation, and investigating ways of using digital 
photography and video affectively to create ‘short circuits within the dominant 
codes of photographic representation’ (Bleyen 2012, xi). In part, and with an 
echo of the stuttering to which Deleuze refers, my journeys to edges of 
representation have been made with the use of sound, a tactic that I discuss at 
more length in Chapter Five. But the journey begins with the circulations of 
data constituting the digital image and the question of what it looks like to be 
in the flows of the image-machine in ways that might unsettle its operations of 
scopic control.
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1.3 Overview of thesis structure
In Chapter Two, I review the impact of computationality on the loss of the 
image as a stable site of representation and visual resistance. My starting point 
is Mirzoeff’s (2016, 292-293) call for a visual activism that can make use of 
‘visual culture to create new self-images, new ways to see and be seen, and new 
ways to see the world.’ I note the role that digital image-making and sharing 
has played in recent activism against coercive State violence in the form of 
police killings of black people in the US, and discuss what the digital has done 
to the radical potential of the image to confront both coercion and control. 
This potential I discuss in terms of the ready transmissibility of the digital 
image and its tendency to leak from prescribed channels of communication. I 
also see such potential in the nature of the digital image as both data object and 
informational process, and its consequent amenability to amendment and 
annotation. But I draw on work from information theory (Terranova 2004) 
and critical software studies (Chun 2011; Galloway 2012) to look at the ways 
in which computationality undermines the representational force of the image. 
In the topology of informational space, the perspectival ground on which 
representation relies is lost, at the same time as the representational force of 
the image is threatened by the inherent ambiguity of a digital visuality whose 
software hides as it shows. 
When brought together with recent work on the de-materialisation wrought by 
informational capitalism (Shaviro 2013; Toscano 2013; Wark 2015), whose 
infrastructural algorithmic operations are increasingly unrepresentable, the 
digital image and its visual unreliability comes to be seen as an instantiation of 
anxiety about the abstracted nature of power that increasingly operates as 
control. It is less to the digital image itself, but rather to the circulations, 
patternings and de/formations of data expressed as light on our screens that we 
must attend, I suggest, if we are to confront the digital visuality of control. 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Chapter Three looks more closely at the data circulations and patternings 
produced by the image-machine of control. Starting from Deleuze’s key 
concepts of dividuation and modulation that he brought to bear on explaining 
the operations of the control society, and noting the ever greater pertinence 
that such concepts have in relation to the workings of informational capitalism, 
I briefly review recent theorising of the digital screen as the site of control, 
through mechanisms of cognitive capture and the attention economy. While 
useful, I suggest that the recourse to notions of consciousness and subjectivity 
in such theorising is ill-equipped to deal with Deleuze’s fundamental insights 
into the posthumanist operations of control at the level of micro and macro 
states, at once sub- and supra-individual.
I use affect theory to make visual sense of this insight, emphasising the role 
that affects of anxiety, in relation to the dividuated subject and the abstracted 
socius, play in inciting the interactivity with the screen on which the State and 
Corporation alike rely for their accumulation and circulation of data. The 
image-machine of control, I propose, is best understood in terms of the 
circulation-image and its affective capture, being the visual incitement to act 
on our screens and in this way augment and sustain the data flows of 
informational capitalism.
Chapter Four details my turn to the digital-visual interface, being the organic-
machinic encounter with the screen, as the site-moment to explore the fluidity 
of these edges and follow where they might leak. Drawing on theorising of the 
fluid dynamics of the interface, I discuss the implications of seeing the 
interface as a dynamic boundary condition whose turbulence of data flows may 
open up what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) referred to as ‘lines of flight’ from 
the striated grid of control. In as much as they are visual, these lines of flight 
help us see and be beyond the workings of the faciality system, and the 
subject-object relations of the gaze within which so much work on visuality 
and power has been confined. 
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I make use of posthumanist theorising to caution against a claiming of visual 
subjectivity from the position of the margin, which may only serve to reinstate 
the centre by which the margin is defined. Instead, I suggest, any challenge to 
the faciality system must engage with the folded informational space of the 
image-machine and the superposition of lookings thus produced. For this I 
look to the digital-visual interface, not as a face-to-face encounter with the 
screen, but as a threshold condition of becoming, in which we may experience 
a visual relation that vibrates between but is irreducible to the dualisms of the 
faciality system. As this ‘between’, the interface constitutes a moment-site of 
encounter with the circulations and rhythms of the image-machine of control 
that is also an affective experience of the potential for other rhythms and 
different flows. 
Drawing on Hookway’s (2014) discussion of the fluidity of the interface as a 
dynamic threshold condition enables me to locate the political potential of the 
interface in its turbulence, as a moment-site of indeterminacy in the data flows 
of the circulation-image. Referencing the work of Bergson (2004), Bachelard 
(2000), Goodman (2012) and Whitehead (1929), I discuss the vibrational 
interface as a way to stay in touch with this indeterminacy and disrupt the 
rhythms of control deployed by the image-machine of control.
In Chapter Five, I discuss my creative work at/in the dynamic indeterminacy 
of the interface. I chart the background to, and evolution of, my creative 
practice, detailing its turn from an interest in visual abstraction, to a concern 
with the circulation-image of control and its rhythms of flow and arrest. I 
discuss my use of photographic montage in medium specific, which engages with 
the topology of informational space through its ‘folds’, as a first experiment in 
disrupting the accelerating tempo of the circulation-image of control through a 
‘pleating’ of its data. It is in these montage-folds, I suggest, that we might 
pause to feel the seeping edges of control, where the potential for the 
emergence of resistance can leak in to the actual.
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I describe my use of haptic photography in figure ground, surface gaze and touch 
light to stay in touch with the smooth space of the interface as a time-space of 
contingency and indeterminacy, potentially resistant to the gridded striations 
of control. As a sense of close looking, my haptic imagery stays open to what 
may be felt with the eyes; with the haptic, the digital-visual interface remains 
an opening within the closed circuits of the image-machine of control. I then 
turn to my use of still and moving images in video format, in look screen and 
moving still, to both pleat and examine the folds and vibrations of the interface. 
I use visual and sonic vibrations to set up counter-rhythms and oscillations that 
Goodman (2012, 82) refers to as the ‘virtuality of the tremble’ that, recalling 
Massumi (1995, 105), may help to ‘enable triggerings of change’ and ‘induce 
the new’.
By way of conclusion, I briefly sum up my reflections on the ‘journey’ of my 
creative work, noting the challenges of bringing the political and aesthetic 
together to confront the operations of control, at a time when both seem ever 
more subsumed by these same operations. My work at the digital-visual 
interface may not have resolved the relationship between image and action, 
seeing and acting, in resisting control, but it does provoke different resonances 
between them in ways that may release energies for change. Within the image-
machine is the vibrational politics of the interface, and it is to this trembling we 
should look if we are to resist the visual operations of control. 
1.4 Creative practice overview
I present six pieces of digital visual work; four sets of photographic ‘stills’ and 
two videos, which together comprise interfaces of resistance. This work was 
produced in and around my home in New York City. All of the visual and 
sound work is my own, and no copyright or ethical issues arose during the 
course of my creative production. I made use of the library at the University of 
Sussex, as well as the collections of the New York Public Library, to develop 
the theoretical foundations for my creative practice.  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In accordance with University of Sussex requirements, this body of work was 
submitted for examination as an index.html file on USB drive. As an 
intervention into the image-machine of control, as a practice of resistance, my 
creative practices exists as a portfolio of visual work on the Tumblr platform at 
https://interfaces-of-resistance.tumblr.com. Here, the two video pieces and four 
photosets, which together constitute the mixed media work interfaces of 
resistance in the image-machine of control, are presented. This visual work is 
accompanied by an opening text that frames, theoretically and politically, its 
intention and production. Each of the six pieces also has its own very brief 
framing text, including technical production details, as follows:
• medium specific: six images (JPEG, 1920 x 1080)
• surface gaze: three images (JPEG, 1920 x 1080)
• figure ground: three images (JPEG, 1920 x 1080)
• touch light: three images (JPEG, 1920 x 1080)
• look screen: HD video (10:26)
• moving still: HD video (10:01)
I began my creative practice with a desire to use visual media to explore what 
control cannot control, the leaks and stains of its remainder. This is the 
potential for resistance that remains with the digital image. From the 
explorations of the fold through photomontage to the use of haptic imagery to 
feel the ‘smooth’ space of the interface, to the creating of interference patterns 
and sonic vibrations in my video work, I have engaged with the dynamic 
threshold condition of the interface as the moment-site for an experience of 
rhythms that counter the insistent anxieties of what I term the circulation-
image of control. The interface is an opportunity to keep open the process of 
forming and the question of what is being formed. My photographic and video 
work has sought to stay present with both this process and this question, 
working with the interface as, in Massumi’s (1998, 16) words, that ‘mode of 
reality implicated in the emergence of new potentials.’ When we feel its 
tremble, the interface becomes an intensive site and sight of such emergence. 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2. What Remains of the Image?
Any exploration of the role of the visual within contemporary modes of control 
and of the ways in which visual media, such as photography and video, remain 
useful in struggles against social control, must question the impact of 
ubiquitous computation on the image as a privileged site/sight of political 
contestation. This chapter begins to name and track the theoretical currents 
whose co-mingling turbulence have energised my critical thinking and creative 
practice on this question. I attend to the altered ontology of the 
technologically-produced image under computational conditions, and what this 
means for image-making as a tool for resisting the operations of what Osborne 
(2013, 118) calls ‘photo-capitalism’. Bringing together theoretical work on 
computationality and associated accounts of cybernetics with concerns about 
the links between visual and political representation, as raised in studies of 
visual culture, I advance a posthumanist politico-aesthetics of the digital image 
in the era of computational capitalism.
From this posthumanist perspective, the sense of loss that shadows the digital 
image is key to both its functioning within scopic regimes of control and its 
radical potential to resist or evade such control. As light abstracted into data, 
the digital image, I suggest, has come to represent the increasingly abstracted, 
apparently immaterial, nature of the forces to which we are subject. I look at 
this visual abstraction in terms of the loss of the representational frame and its 
replacement by a circulation and patterning of data whose spatio-temporal 
deformations unsettle the perspectival ground on which representation relies. 
The impact of the computational on the visual is to render all images moving 
images, and it is the technics and politics of managing and stabilising their data 
flows that constitute the scopic operations of control. While we live in a torrent 
of images, it is to the dynamics of these flows, rather than the images 
themselves, that we must attend in any effort to counter the visuality of 
control. 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2.1 Resisting images
Images remain convulsive. With his mobile phone, Ramsey Orta documented 
the arrest of Eric Garner on 17 July 2014 in Staten Island, New York, and 
recorded his friend’s dying words, ‘I can’t breathe’, as the police, using an 
illegal choke hold, asphyxiated him (Daily News, 2015). The video, very soon 
acquired and made public by New York City’s Daily News, sparked outrage as 
it spread rapidly online, leading to street protests and helping to fuel what 
would become the Black Lives Matter movement (Black Lives Matter, 2016). 
The explosion of image production made possible by digital technologies is 
fundamental to contemporary visual culture and to what Mirzoeff (2016, 13) 
defines as its primary concern: ‘[v]isual culture is something we engage in as 
an active way to create change, not just a way to see what is happening.’ 
Digital democratisation of image-making, and its enabling of ‘an active way to 
create change’, has its precursor in the emergence of portable video recording 
technology in the 1960s, which was quickly taken up by community groups 
and activists in the USA and elsewhere as a tool in their social justice 
struggles. As Boyle (1992, 68) notes, New York City was the hub of this 
emergent activist video scene, including prominent early collectives such as 
People's Video Theater, who ‘used live and taped feedback of embattled 
community groups as a catalyst for social change’. It was camcorder footage of 
the savage beating of Rodney King by officers from the LA Police Department 
in 1991, filmed by resident George Holliday from his nearby apartment, that 
fuelled the violent protests which erupted when the officers were acquitted in 
1992 of all charges relating to the use of excessive force.
But the digital has exponentially increased the capacity to bear witness to state 
violence. When Oscar Grant III was fatally shot by police at Fruitvale BART 
station in Oakland, California, in the early hours of New Year’s Day 2009, the 
killing was captured on multiple mobile phones by many of the hundreds of 
people returning home from New Year’s Eve parties, and shared widely on 
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social media platforms. Less than a year after Eric Garner’s death, US 
progressive magazine Mother Jones carried a story titled ‘13 Killings by Police 
Captured on Video in the Past Year’, some half of which were documented by 
bystanders on their mobile phones (Vicens and Lee 2015). 
The smartphone is now the most popular camera. As Bratton (2013) reports:
With the comparatively instantaneous adoption of mobile devices (Turing 
complete machine + camera + homing tether + telephonic voice relay), we 
have seen an explosion in the absolute volume of images of the world, 
dwarfing the total sum produced before the mobile phone appeared in our 
hands.
The smartphone enabled one trillion photographs to be taken in 2014 
(Mirzoeff 2016). Given this, as Terranova (2004, 141) notes, ‘it is not 
surprising that the most significant feature of contemporary mediascapes is 
their over-saturation with image and information flows (including the acoustic 
image or sound).’
Cameras in phones are not only everywhere but ‘everyware’ (Kitchin 2011, 
945, cited in Berry 2012, 392). The convulsive force of the image to confront 
state violence, and the forces of social control, by representing their reality is 
the product not only of the democratisation of image-making but the digital 
infrastructure of image-sharing made possible by ubiquitous computation 
(Featherstone 2009). The result is a world full of images such that ‘the gap, if 
there ever was one, between photography and life itself continues to close so 
that, in both material and symbolic terms, photographic media can be said to 
shape the world that they pertain to represent’ (Kember 2012). 
But shape in what ways? At issue is the function of the digital image in relation 
to social protest and political struggle, and specifically the impact of 
computationality on what Mirzoeff (2016) characterises as ‘visual activism’. 
He (Mirzoeff 2016, 293) defines such activism as ‘the interaction of pixels and 
actions to make change’. But in what ways can and do pixels, as the making 
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visual of information, inform action to change this world? Digital artist Hito 
Steyerl (2014, 30), recalling the protests leading to the collapse of the former 
Soviet bloc, emphasises that ‘[a]round 1989, television images started walking 
through screens, right into reality.’ Far from the induced passivity of the 
spectacle, as identified by Debord (1970, 1990) in his critique of televisual 
alienation, such screened images, for Steyerl (2014, 30), ‘are rather nodes of 
energy and matter that migrate across different supports, shaping and affecting 
people, landscapes, politics and social systems [which have] acquired an 
uncanny ability to proliferate, transform and activate.’ The conditions and 
possibilities of this ‘uncanny ability’ still require closer investigation, however.
2.2 Computational conditions of the image
With the computational, Berry (2011, 12) suggests, ‘certain aspects of reality 
come to the fore, such as the notion of orderliness, calculability, and 
predictability, whilst others, like chaos, desire and uncertainty, retreat into 
obscurity.’ Franklin (2012b, 153) notes that the computational refers to ‘the 
broad array of social, economic, political, and cultural changes theorised 
through cybernetics research in the 1940s and both inspired and emblematised 
by the universal, binary, and discrete functionality of the computer.’ 
In naming the field of cybernetics research and its key concerns and questions, 
Wiener (1961) argued that ‘numbers are the best way to capture an 
intrinsically unstable and unmeasurable matter’ (Terranova 2004, 33). As Plant 
(1997, 158) reminds us, ‘[c]ybernetic systems, like organic lives, were 
conceived as instances of a struggle for order in a continually degenerating 
world which is always sliding towards chaos.’ Computationality is the logic 
and practice of cutting into the flow of life in order to manage its inherent 
disorder. Terranova (2004, 32) makes clear that for ‘cyberneticians the discrete 
cut implied by a digital code made up for the approximation inherent in 
continuous or analogous quantities (which can only capture a static average 
rather than the instability of the micro).’  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In order to function, Berry (2011, 15) notes, ‘a computer requires that 
everything is transformed from the continuous flow of our everyday reality 
into a grid of numbers that can be stored as a representation of reality which 
can then be manipulated using algorithms.’ Images produced by the ‘universal, 
binary, and discrete functionality of the computer’, as the vast majority of 
technologically-produced images are now, are underpinned by this 
computational desire for ‘orderliness, calculability, and predictability’. Such 
images are ‘encoded digitally by uniformly subdividing the picture plane into a 
finite Cartesian grid of cells (know as pixels) and specifying the intensity or 
colour of each cell by means of an integer number drawn from some limited 
range’ (Mitchell 1992, 5). Conformed to a rectilinear grid of cells, the images 
on our screens are the expression of a two-dimensional array of integers. As 
Legrady (1990, 267) emphasises, ‘[i]t is this relationship of modular units with 
definite values that makes it totally controllable.’ 
Manovich, in his influential account of The Language of New Media, declared 
numerical representation to be the first of his five principles characterising the 
‘general tendencies of a culture undergoing computerisation’ (2001, 27). Being 
composed of code means that the digital image is a computational object, 
subject to mathematical expression and algorithmic manipulation. ‘In short, 
media becomes programmable’, Manovich concluded (2001, 27). This issue of 
programmability will be addressed more closely in Chapter Three, for it is 
central to questions about the scopic operations and limits of contemporary 
social control. To get to these questions, however, requires consideration of the 
more fundamental issue of the ontology of the image itself, for it is often held 
that with digital image-making technologies has come a loss of indexical 
fidelity to the real. Balsom (2017) notes that:
The spectre of easy manipulation hovered over the digital image, 
threatening its evidentiary value. Reality was seen to be an effect of images 
rather than their cause; photographic truth was debunked as a discursive 
construction, the power of the indexical guarantee deflated.
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With the digital image, it has become a commonplace to observe that the 
‘referent has come unstuck’ (Mitchell 1992, 31). The fact that the digital image 
can be internally generated, without any necessary relationship to or 
connection with a reality outside of the computational apparatus producing the 
image has, for many, damaged the photograph’s ‘aura of superior evidential 
efficacy’, relying as it did on ‘the special bond between fugitive reality and 
permanent image that is formed at the instant of exposure’ (Mitchell 1992, 24). 
For Legrady (1990, 267), digital images ‘simulate rather then represent the 
real.’ 
Digital simulation, it is suggested, undermines what Osborne (2013, 124) 
refers to as photography’s ‘famous meaning-effect of “the real”’, its indexical 
relationship with a material reality outside of itself. Drawing on Pierce’s 
typology of signs, in which the index refers to a sign that operates through 
‘association by contiguity’, referring to its object through a direct connection, 
the analog image is distinguished from its digital successor by virtue of the 
former’s contiguity to external reality through the direct inscription of light 
(Emery 2011). With analog photography, there is ‘the general presumption 
that the image must have been dependent to some extent on a real-world event’ 
(Legrady 1990, 267). Digital simulation undermines this presumption.
But the fidelity of the analog as a representation that is ‘real’ has been over-
stated. The reality-effect of analog photography’s celebrated indexicality has 
always been shadowed by the artifice of photographic capture and rendering 
(Rexer 2009). Barthes (2010) emphasised that the photograph was not simply 
denotive, but ‘generated through the connotative strategies of subject selection, 
framing, and vantage point’ (Legrady 1990, 266). For Mitchell (2010, 44), ‘it 
seems clear that both the profilmic event and the dark-room process have 
always been manipulable, if not with the ease and rapidity provided by 
programs such as Photoshop.’
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Nor should the discontinuities between analog and digital image-making be 
overstated. Digital imaging applications ‘such as Photoshop’ often have analog 
antecedents. ‘Photoshop’s seemingly “born digital” (or “software-native”) 
filters have direct physical predecessors in analog filters’, Manovich (2013, 
134) reminds us. ‘[C]ommonplace rhetoric has it that the world has entered a 
“digital age” whose dramatic “dawning” has made the analog obsolete’, 
Massumi (2002, 143) writes, but insists that ‘[t]his is nonsense.’ Mitchell 
(2010, 45) concludes, with reference to the newness of the digital, that 
‘whatever this newness is, it will not likely be well described by a binary 
history that separates the digital image from all that preceded it.’ 
In considering the impact of computationality on the ontology of the image 
and, relatedly, on the scopic operations of social control and the use of visual 
media to contest such control, the key issue for my creative practice has not 
been a simplistic analog/digital distinction, but working out the implications of 
the digital image as a data object, and thus informational process. In common 
with analog video and television, digital image-making technologies encode 
light. Tracing this continuity, Manovich (2013, 133) notes that, ‘[s]uccessive 
media technologies based on electronics (such as the telegraph, telephone, 
radio, television), and digital computers employ the coding of messages or 
“content.”’ This means that rather ‘than operating on sounds, images, video, or 
texts directly, electronic and digital devices operate on the continuous 
electronic signals or discrete numerical data’ (Manovich 2013, 133). As 
Manovich (2013, 133) stresses, ‘this, in turn, makes possible the idea of 
information - a disembodied, abstract and universal dimension of any message 
separate from its content.’
The notion that information is ‘disembodied, abstract and universal’ has long 
been contested, as Hayles (1999) makes clear in her review of the debates at 
the Macy conferences about how best to define “information”, debates that 
pitched Shannon and Weaver’s (1963) abstract mathematical models against 
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the embodied contextual emphases of MacKay (1969) and Bateson (1972). 
The engineering challenges of translating information theory into 
communication technologies, however, favoured models of information that 
prioritised standardisation, universality and quantification. The view that 
‘information in the technical sense has nothing to do with meaning’ (Hayles 
1999, 32) prevailed: information was signal rather than signification.
This is evident in Manovich’s formulation, and has become the orthodox 
understanding of digital media as informational. In the entry on “Information” 
in Critical Terms for Media Studies, Clarke states this orthodoxy without 
equivocation. For Clarke (2010, 157), ‘[i]nformation has no concreteness’ 
because it ‘is a virtual structure dependent upon distributed coding/decoding 
regimes within which it can function’. In Section 5.2, I discuss the ways in 
which my creative practice evolved to explore the signaletic properties of the 
digital image, and the potential for resistance to the scopic operations of 
control to be found in the concept of noise associated with Shannon and 
Weaver’s conception of information as signal, not signification.
But of immediate concern here, with respect to the impact of computationality 
on the ontology of the image and its implications for the visual operations of 
social control, are the issues of abstraction and dematerialisation raised by the 
conception of the digital image as informational. Mitchell’s iconology 
emphasises the extent to which the visual image, whether digital or analog, has 
always been ambiguously im/material. ‘An image is always both there and not 
there, appearing in or on or as a material object yet also ghostly, spectral, and 
evanescent’, Mitchell (2010, 39) writes. But this im/material ambiguity is 
heightened yet further by the conditions of ubiquitous computation that make 
possible the ‘degree of image saturation in image culture that was 
unimaginable in earlier times’ (Mitchell 2010, 39).
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This ambiguity becomes clearer with a closer examination of the concepts of 
data and information, and the relationship between them. The definitional 
imprecision of the concepts makes this examination difficult, however (Braman 
1989; Buckland 1991; Floridi 2013; Floridi 2014). As Zins (2007) reports, a 
moderated discussion among a panel of experts from the field of Information 
Science, comprising 57 participants from 16 countries, formulated some 130 
differing definitions of the meaning of, and relations between, the concepts of 
data, information and knowledge. Given these levels of imprecision and 
disagreement, it should be noted that a thorough review of the extensive 
academic debates on these concepts and relationships is beyond the scope of 
this current work. But I discuss below my understanding and use of the 
concepts of data and information as they have shaped my creative practice, 
and in particular the ways in which formulations of the relationship between 
the two concepts have generated useful insights into the ambiguously im/
material ontology of the digital image.
A useful distinction between data and information is proffered by Gitelman 
and Jackson (2013, 1) in terms of scale, when they define data as ‘units or 
morsels of information’. ‘Part of what distinguishes data from the more general 
category, information, is their discreetness’, they (Gitelman and Jackson 2013, 
8) emphasise. Data are ‘particulate’, existing in ‘little bits’ which, when 
aggregated, become information. For the mathematical model of information 
espoused at the Macy conferences, the patterning of particulate data as 
information was what constituted information’s abstraction. Hayles (1999, 18) 
notes that ‘Shannon’s theory defines information as a probability function with 
no dimensions, no materiality, and no necessary connection with meaning. It is 
a pattern, not a presence.’ 
When Manovich (2013, 132) argues persuasively that digital media are ‘a 
particular subset of the larger category “information”’, based on the 
‘conceptual relationship between “information processing” and “image 
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processing”’, implicit in this claim is an insistence on the primacy of pattern. 
But if this data/information distinction suggests a view of the digital image as 
an informational object produced by a patterning of data-as-light, its quality of 
abstraction, of ‘no materiality’, is necessarily more ambiguous. For the 
information that the image ‘represents’ necessarily requires a material base for 
it to be seen as an image. Hayles (1999, 13) notes that ‘it can be a shock to 
remember that for information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a 
medium.’ Gitelman and Jackson (2013, 6) highlight the ‘general precept that 
data are abstract’ but also note that ‘it follows from their abstraction that data 
ironically require material expression. The retention and manipulation of 
abstractions require stuff, material things.’
The ontology of the digital image, then, is fundamentally ambiguous, as 
immaterial information that requires a material infrastructure of data storage, 
distribution and display. Indeed, it is doubly ambiguous: being not only im/
material but also both object and process. As Hayles (1999, 56) reminds us, 
‘[w]hen information is made representational […] it is conceptualised as an 
action rather than a thing.’ It is the encoding of light as data, whose 
antecedents are the analog electronic media technologies discussed by 
Manovich (2013), that accounts for the processual nature of digital visuality. 
Dienst (1994, 20) makes the point clearly with reference to early developments 
in television, the immediate precursor of digital visual technologies, for whom 
the priority was signal transmission not image production:
Unlike cinema, which from the beginning constructed object-images using 
nineteenth-century industrial (or even preindustrial) techniques, television 
began by testing its ability to circulate the most ordinary expressions and 
stereotypes of a solidly, even proudly, philistine corporate imagination, 
treated as raw data for the machine.
This attention to digital visual technologies in terms of the circulation of ‘data 
for the machine’ rather than the production of image-objects entails a re-
framing of analysis of digital visuality in relation to the scopic operations of 
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‘control societies’ (Deleuze 1995b), which I turn to in the next chapter. Central 
to this re-framing is the ontological ambiguity of the digital image as data 
object and informational process, at once abstract and material, both unsettled 
and unsettling. 
Heilmann (2009) makes use of Kirschenbaum’s (2008) concepts of forensic 
materiality and formal materiality in ways that are helpful for drawing out the 
implications of this ambiguity for questions of social control and the 
possibilities of visual resistance. As Heilmann (2009, 18) explains, the ‘forensic 
materiality of digital devices comprises their concrete physical setup from the 
casing down to the nanometer-sized circuits and micrometer-sized 
electromagnetic inscriptions of data on hard drives.’ This physical setup is 
particular, existing in a specific time and place, but its purpose is 
standardisation. ‘The resulting formal materiality is an abstraction that has 
cleansed data from the ‘dirt’ and ‘noise’ of physical inscriptions, elevated it to 
the state of ‘pure’ digital information’ (Heilmann 2009, 18). The formal 
materiality of the digital image, as an ‘abstraction that has cleansed data’, is the 
product of the forensic materiality of digital infrastructures (from sensors and 
circuits to servers and satellites).
This dual materiality is significant because the standardisation which is its goal 
is paradoxically generative of mutability. Heilmann (2009, 19) explains that:
The purpose of forensic and the property of formal materiality are absolute 
definitude and sameness of form—but definitude and sameness of form not 
only for the sake of stability [...] but also, and more importantly, for exact 
switching of form.
As a material abstraction, the digital image is unsettled because ‘[d]igital media 
take form as forms that are first and foremost processible’ (Heilmann 2009, 
15). Mitchell (1992, 51) echoes this observation, noting that ‘computer files are 
open to modification at any time, and mutant versions proliferate rapidly and 
endlessly.’ What Osborne (2013, 128) describes as ‘the extraordinary “fine 
grain” manipulation that becomes possible at the level of the pixel’ is usually 
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taken as a sign of the digital image’s loss of fidelity to the real, making possible 
a capacity for simulation that threatens to displace reality itself (Baudrillard 
1983). But rather than displacing the real, the open and endlessly processible 
form of the digital image enhances its ability to proliferate and confuse reality. 
The digital image is rendered unstable by the fact that in ‘the realm of digital 
processing, there is no “true” state or appearance of any object conforming to 
its “actual being”, meaning that there ‘are only momentary states in the course 
of a potentially endless chain of processing that may or may not be adequate to 
some specific demand or task’ (Heilmann 2009, 20). Rubinstein and Sluis 
(2013, 30) note that:
[I]t becomes misleading to talk about the photographic “frame” or the 
singular image as the image is everywhere all at once, accessible from any 
point in the network, establishing a regime of intoxication and plenitude 
through its rapid multiplication and profusion.
This instability, its ontological status as data object and informational process, 
heightens the liberatory potential of the image, not least because as flow, the 
digital image is fundamentally uncontainable. Terranova (2004, 2) emphasises 
the ‘tendency of informational flows to spill over from whatever network they 
are circulating in and hence to escape the narrowness of the channel and to 
open up to a larger milieu.’ Digital images, by their computational nature, seep 
and leak; they ‘spread and interact, mix and mutate within a singular (and yet 
differentiated) informational plane’ (Terranova 2004, 2).
The result is that such images are more difficult to contain. As Steyerl (2014, 
31) makes clear, ‘[d]ata, sounds and images are now routinely transitioning 
beyond screens into a different state of matter.’ The tendency of digital images, 
as informational flows, to leak or escape from their designated channels 
renders them politically volatile. The digital image is marked by a potential for 
chaos and uncertainty which the computational desire for ‘orderliness, 
calculability, and predictability’ identified by Berry (2011, 12) struggles to 
contain. 
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In the report (Vicens and Lee 2015) referred to previously on ‘13 Killings by 
Police Captured on Video in the Past Year’, it is noteworthy that six of these 
killings were recorded by police video (whether by body-worn or dashboard 
cameras) and two by surveillance cameras (both private and state-owned), 
with the videos making their way into the public domain whether through 
leaks or Freedom of Information Act releases. Videos such as these are vectors, 
potential ‘lines of flight’ in the sense in which Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 55) 
understood them as ‘movements of deterritorialization’, as ‘vectors that 
generate an open space and the potentials for giving consistency to the 
latter’ (Koerner 2011, 163).
However, the restlessness of the digital image also makes it an unsettling sight. 
The translation of light into binary code secures the ‘creative potential of 
digitalized data to generate an in-principle-infinite multiplicity of forms of 
visualizations’ (Osborne 2013, 130). This multiplicity of form may feel 
generative of possibility, ‘establishing a regime of intoxication and plenitude’, 
but it also arouses anxiety. ‘Via the multiplicity of visualizations, digitalization 
draws attention to the essentially de-realized character of the image’, Osborne 
(2013, 131) notes. The image is de-realised by its processual form, ‘bound to 
change constantly into other forms, themselves assembled from multiple 
sources and different sets, never to reach a final state that could be called a 
‘true’ representation’ (Heilmann 2009, 22). The anxieties this can provoke are 
discussed next.
2.3 Anxieties of representation
The ontology of the digital image as processual form is the consequence of its 
immersion in circuits of data, whose flows unsettle the perspectival ground on 
which the representation of a ‘real’ has conventionally been based. 
Computationality has rendered space informational in ways that destabilise 
representation. For Terranova (2004, 37), space becomes ‘informational’ when 
‘it presents an excess of sensory data, a radical indeterminacy in our 
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knowledge, and a nonlinear temporality involving a multiplicity of mutating 
variables and different intersecting levels of observation and interaction.’ This 
indeterminacy and multiplicity mean that this space, as Terranova (2004, 37) 
suggests:
is not so much a three-dimensional, perspectival space where subjects carry 
out actions and relate to each other, but a field of displacements, mutations 
and movements that do not support the actions of a subject, but decompose 
it, recompose it and carry it along.
The ‘foregrounding of informational flows across the socius also implies a crisis 
of representation (both linguistic and political)’ because ‘the logic of 
representation presupposes a homogenous space where different subjects can 
recognize each other when they are different and hence also when they are 
identical’ (Terranova 2004, 35). This homogenous space is now a ‘pure 
patchwork’ of Riemann spaces (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 485), whose 
multiplicities are the result of heterogeneous data flows. 
In Terranova’s suggestive formulation, the ‘empty space organized by a three-
dimensional perspective’ (2004, 35), on which the separation of, and thus 
visual relation between self/subject and other/object depends, is destabilised by 
this ‘immersive, multidimensional and transformative topology’ (2004, 28) of 
ubiquitous computation. In turn, the penetration of computation into every 
aspect of life is enmeshed with the imperatives of transnational capitalism, 
which itself has been described as ‘rather more topological in that the dense 
network of information that overlays the territory enables the landscape to be 
stretched, compressed, folded, and twisted into new shapes - at least for the 
purposes of economic activity’ (Wark 2015, 5). In the flows and folds of this 
datascape of contemporary capitalism, the space of representation of selves 
and others is de-formed, denying a topographic perspective ‘from an optical 
standpoint outside that space’ (Cartwright 2014, 301). This loss of perspectival 
ground is unsettling for any political project of change that would base itself on 
such representation.
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At issue here is the broader question of the relationship between visual and 
political representation. Steyerl (2012, 169) recalls that ‘[f]or a long time my 
generation has been trained to think that representation was the primary site 
of contestation for both politics and aesthetics.’ But now, it seems, ‘a growing 
number of unmoored and floating images corresponds to a growing number of 
disenfranchised, invisible, or even disappeared and missing people’ (Steyerl 
2012, 171). The informatic ‘re-ordering of life’ (Kember 2012) effected by 
ubiquitous computing and transnational capitalism is also re-ordering visual 
representation. Yet the insistence on visual (self-)representation as a mode of 
political enfranchisement persists, especially by and for those whose political 
visibility is suppressed. 
With cameras now everywhere, the radical possibilities of image-making 
proliferate. Mirzoeff (2016, 251) emphasises the importance of visual activism 
to the political struggles in urban centres across the world from 2011 onwards 
against economic austerity and political disenfranchisement, for it ‘is here that 
the young, urban, networked majority are questioning both forms of 
representation.’ He (Mirzoeff 2016, 287) insists, ‘that the implication of “they 
do not represent us” (in all senses of that term) is that we must find ways to 
represent ourselves.’ Though inspired by the visual activism of these young 
people, Mirzoeff (2016, 251) cautions that such activism ‘raises the question as 
to whether the new global majority can represent itself both politically and 
visually, or whether the visible oligarchies generated by globalization will 
continue.’
But what does real representation look like in the era of digital visuality and 
informational capitalism? It is to the topological space of data flows that we 
must attend if we are to understand the linked challenges of visual and political 
representation in relation to the digital image. The implications of this 
informational space of visuality for notions of subjectivity and experiences of 
political agency are taken up in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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At this stage, however, I remain with the question of the digital image as a 
space of representation, both visual and political. For it follows from the 
analysis thus far that such a space is profoundly unsettled by computational 
conditions and the informational dimension they reveal. Franklin (2012b, 168) 
is clear that ‘tomorrow’s radical practice – which is always sadly doomed to be 
a computational practice according to the definition of computation dreamed 
of by cyberneticians and neoliberal ideologists alike […] – will be based not on 
contesting or even exceeding representation but rather on escaping it.’ In 
Terranova's (2004, 9) view, a recognition of this informational space ‘allows us 
to move away from an exclusive focus on meaning and representation as the 
only political dimension of culture.’
What it might mean to escape representation in ways that can still contribute 
to the kinds of visual activism already discussed has been a central concern of 
my creative practice. Where might a visual practice seek to escape to, given the 
immersive informational space by which it is constituted? ‘Is there any outside 
anymore, when networks encircle the globe?’ asks Galloway (2012, 120). 
Without an outside, it is difficult to get critical perspective, a problem that has 
long been identified in relation to the totalising impulses of capitalism. For 
Osborne (2013, 118), ‘the image-space of the photographic has expanded to 
global dimensions as a constituent part of what we might call photo-
capitalism’, which is a ‘distinctively transnational and translinguistic cultural-
economic form.’ Photo-capitalism is the latest iteration of what Dienst (2006, 
44) sees as capitalism’s visual compulsion, as it ‘persists in representing itself 
and reproducing itself everywhere, foiling any attempt to sum it up in a word 
or turn of phrase.’ Instead, Dienst (2006, 44) suggests, it ‘offers its own images 
as its only self-image. How, then, can capital be figured or at least brought 
within reach of a representation beyond its own representations?’. 
Contemporary globalised capitalism, in its apparent ubiquity as transnational 
cultural-economic form, is especially resistant to such critical perspectives, 
being simply too pervasive to see as a totality. 
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Furthermore, its computational infrastructure is resistant to representation. As 
Galloway (2012, 92) puts it: ‘The point of unrepresentability is the point of 
power. And the point of power today is not in the image. The point of power 
today resides in networks, computers, algorithms, information, and data.’ 
Galloway (2012, 91) notes that the unrepresentability of power means that 
there ‘is quite literally an inability to render the network as an image 
differentiated from other images. There is a single image and thus there is 
none.’
Attempts to visually represent political conditions are further compromised by 
what Franklin (2011) characterises as the ‘real subsumption of images made 
possible by computation.’ This real subsumption, Franklin (2011) suggests, is 
linked to the fact that ‘today software, unlike painting, photography or cinema 
in prior historical periods, is not only a dominant form of visual cultural 
production […] but also shapes the dominant form of work in industrial 
countries.’ I return to these issues of screen labour and the attention economy 
in my discussion in Chapter Three of the image-machine of social control. 
But I am concerned here with the ontological implications of the real 
subsumption of the image by software, which ‘is rooted in symbolic logic not 
optical vision’, as Galloway (2012, 63) notes. The digital image is ontologically 
ambiguous, a visual experience based on a non-visual operating logic; ‘the 
computer consummates the retreat from the realm of the imaginary to the 
purely symbolic realm of writing’, notes Galloway (2012, 17), referencing the 
work of Kittler (2009). The digital image is a fetish, a representation that 
masks or misrepresents its real conditions of existence (Marx 1977; Osborne 
2005). ‘As the screen serves up the image of the photograph, the operations 
that deliver them to the screen are increasingly unseen and unknowable’, 
Rubinstein and Sluis (2013, 34) make clear. 
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The pervasive image-making made possible by ubiquitous computation 
appears to make the world ever more visualisable, ever more transparent. But, 
as Chun (2004, 27) explains, ‘for computers to become transparency machines, 
the fact that they compute – that they generate text and images rather than 
merely represent or reproduce what exists elsewhere – must be forgotten.’ Our 
computational condition is marked by a visual anxiety about the fraught 
relationship between seeing and knowing. ‘Algorithmic interfaces - even as 
they flaunt their own highly precise, virtuosic levels of detail - prove that 
something is happening behind and beyond the visible’, Galloway (2012, 86) 
makes clear. 
There was a time when the image-making technologies of industrial capitalism 
could be turned against it, to make visible and strange its operations (Giles 
2007) or, in the case of Benjamin’s (2002) celebrated optical unconscious, to 
explode the apparent confinements of the capitalist present, exposing the 
‘possibility of creating an openness to the future’ (Caygill 1998, 94, cited in 
Hansen 2012, 158). The digital image, however, hides the operations of power 
even as it may purport to reveal them. As Chun (2011, 2) asks, ‘[w]ho really 
know what lurks behind our smiling interfaces, behind the objects we click 
and manipulate?’.
2.4 Anxieties of abstraction
But it is not only that digital images and screens misrepresent their visual 
promise by (re)producing an imaginary relationship to real conditions. The 
reality to be captured by the image has been penetrated by informatisation to 
such a degree that reality itself appears increasingly de-materialised. There is, 
as Beller (2006, 243) notes, a ‘tendency toward increasing abstraction under 
capitalism’, a tendency which the digital image appears to express and 
accelerate. The anxiety born of the digital-visual conjuncture can be grasped, 
then, as an affect of computational capitalism itself. 
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The ‘third nature’ (Wark 2015) of informational capitalism appears to be that 
of an ontological insecurity linked to the abstraction, the de-materialisation, of 
what is still referred to as the ‘real economy’. In Shaviro’s (2013) view, 
‘[f]inance operates according to a transgressive cultural logic of manic 
innovation, and ever-ramifying metalevels of self-referential abstraction’, to the 
point where its operations appear to ‘float in a hyperspace of pure contingency, 
free of indexical relation to any “underlying” whatsoever.’ The economic crash 
of 2008 highlighted the extent to which the financialised global economy is 
now black-boxed. As Toscano (2013) suggests, the ‘opacity of transactions 
happening fathoms beneath our perceptual threshold and far beyond our 
mathematical comprehension makes most “representations” of this bleeding-
edge of finance capital so many ciphers of our ignorance.’
The abstractions of computational capitalism constitute a crisis of visuality, its 
algorithmically accelerated trading of ever more opaque financial instruments 
increasingly beyond the scope not merely of human oversight and regulation, 
but human cognition as well. Toscano (2013) emphasises that the ‘inscrutable, 
abstract subsumption of life by finance seems to have become a matter of 
everyday experience, the anxious perception of causalities and constraints 
beyond our understanding and response.’ But not beyond our affective 
experience. For as Shaviro (2013)  emphasises:
At the same time that it floats off into digital abstraction, however, 
neoliberalism also operates directly on our bodies. Data are extracted from 
everything we feel, think, and do. These data are appropriated and 
consolidated, and then packaged and sold back to us.
The feeling that our material realities are no longer simply the product of 
human agency, however elite and remote, but are in effect moulded by the 
apparently immaterial data flows that constitute the circuits of financialised 
capitalism induces an affect of insecurity. 
It is this ethereal quality of power under conditions of ubiquitous computation 
that artist Trevor Paglen has captured so well in his evanescent depictions of 
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the US military’s drone warfare programme, killing machines rendered as 
smudges and smears against a wash of aerial blue. As a review (Squibb 2013) 
of a Paglen show at Metro Pictures in New York City in 2013 asked, ‘if state 
violence now takes place via a process of radical abstraction, to what extent 
can it be contained or defeated by historical forms of representation?’. Paglen’s 
aesthetics of abstraction are about the politics of abstraction produced by 
computationality and its operations within both algorithmic capitalism and the 
surveillant assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) that characterises state 
formations in the centres of global capitalism. 
The material forces most determinative of life in the global North appear 
immaterial. It is this ambiguous abstraction that the digital image has come to 
anxiously represent, as Osborne (2013, 128-129) makes clear:
[I]t is anxiety about the real generated by these peculiar social forms 
(within which the most real appears unreal, and the apparently or 
empirically real has little determinative significance) that is displaced onto 
and invested in the problem of the referential significance of digitally 
produced images.
Can the digital image be a site and sight of liberatory practice? Rubinstein and 
Sluis (2013, 35) themselves ask, ‘[i]n other words, what is the political power 
of the undecidable digital image? The answer might be found in the ability of 
the digital image to capture the modes of production, the organization and the 
structure of the network.’ But the forgoing analysis suggests that the digital 
image, in its visual ambiguities and imbrication within ever-more abstracted 
operations of computational capitalism, is ill-equipped to enact such capture. 
Instead, Steyerl has argued that we should embrace these inadequacies of the 
‘poor image’ and its de-materialisation. She (Steyerl 2012, 52) urges a 
participation in, rather than a looking at, the image, recognising that it ‘doesn't 
represent reality. It is a fragment of the real world. It is a thing just like any 
other - a thing like you and me.’ It is through this participation, getting 
involved with the digital image’s ‘glitches and artifacts, the traces of its rips and 
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transfers’ (Steyerl 2012, 53), that a sense of agency may be released. Steyerl 
(2012, 52) claims that to ‘participate in the image as thing means to participate 
in its potential agency - an agency that is not necessarily beneficial.’ 
The speculative realist echoes of an object-oriented ontology are clear here, a 
review of whose extensive literature is beyond the scope of this current work 
(Brown 2001; Barad 2003; Bryant et al. 2011; Harman 2011). That images, as 
things, may be agentic ‘like you and me’ clearly has an appeal to any project 
invested in the kinds of visual activism referred to at the beginning of this 
chapter. But as the forgoing analysis of the informatisation of the digital image 
suggests, its ontology is not simply thing-like but unstable and processual, a 
flow with a tendency to seep and leak in unintended ways. Based on the signal 
codification of video and television, the computational image is in some sense 
not about image-objects at all, but rather a circulation and patterning of 
information as light. As Dienst (1994, 20) argues, the televisual is that in 
which ‘composition is always in process’, for ‘television proves that it is not 
built to produce images (like cinema), but to open and frame fields of visuality 
where a number of images, or any image whatsoever, can be constituted as 
points of visibility.’
What remains of the digital image, then, for a visual activism that would 
engage with power under conditions of informational capitalism is less its 
representational desire, compromised in so many ways by these same 
conditions, than its circulations, patternings and de/formations of ‘fields of 
visuality’. As Dienst (1994, 46) notes, the ‘information and telecommunication 
machinery now encompassing the earth […] exists first because of capital’s 
imperative to circulate and to change form as quickly as possible.’ In her later 
writing on ‘circulationism’, which she describes as the art of ‘postproducing, 
launching, and accelerating’ the image, Steyerl herself appears to embrace this 
perspective. With circulationism, Steyerl (2014, 37) moves away from a focus 
on the image-object to a concern with ‘short-circuiting existing networks, 
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circumventing and bypassing corporate friendship and hardware monopolies’, 
developing an ‘art of recoding or rewiring the system by exposing state 
scopophilia, capital compliance and wholesale surveillance.’ 
The challenge of visual activism is that of engaging with the circulations and 
flows of the digital image. In its processual nature and tendency to leak from 
prescribed channels of communication, the digital image is a powerful medium 
for political action. But the computational conditions that make possible these 
political affordances also undermine the representational force of the image. 
The perspectival ground on which representation relies is lost in the topology 
of informational space, at the same time as the representational force of the 
image is threatened by the inherent ambiguity of a digital visuality whose 
software hides as it shows. At the same time, the informatisation wrought by 
algorithmic capitalism means that its operations are increasingly 
unrepresentable, rendering the digital image and its visual unreliability an 
expression of anxiety about the abstracted nature of power that operates as 
control. It is less to the digital image itself, but rather to the circulations, 
patternings and de/formations of data expressed as light on our digital screens 
that we must attend, I suggest, if we are to confront the digital visuality of 
control. 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3. In the Image-Machine of Control
In this chapter, I look more closely at the visual operations of social control, as 
sketched by Deleuze (1995b) in his prescient Postscript on Control Societies. I 
discuss the continuing pertinence of Deleuze’s key concepts of dividuation and 
modulation for understanding the contemporary operations of the digital-
visual infrastructure of data circulations and patternings. This infrastructure I 
characterise as the ‘image-machine of control’, and I briefly review recent 
theorising of the digital screen as the site of control through the mechanisms of 
cognitive capture and the attention economy. 
While useful perspectives, I suggest that their explicit or implicit recourse to 
notions of consciousness and subjectivity is ill-equipped to deal with Deleuze’s 
fundamental insights into the operations of control at the level of micro and 
macro states, at once sub- and supra-individual. Indeed, it is through the 
modulating of these singularities and multiplicities that any sense of the 
‘individual’ comes to be constituted. I draw on affect theory to make visual 
sense of this insight, emphasising the role that affects of insecurity, at the level 
of the dividuated subject and the abstracted socius, play in inciting the 
interactivity with the screen on which the State and Corporation alike rely for 
their accumulation and circulation of data. 
The image-machine of control constitutes us as photographic ‘agents’ through 
its mechanisms of affective capture, inciting an interactivity with our screens 
and in this way augmenting and sustaining the data flows of informational 
capitalism. Any project of visual activism concerned with challenging the 
algorithmic operations of State and corporate control, I argue, must confront 
the circulation-image, so named because the digital image is both constituted 
by and productive of data flows. It is to these conditions of imagistic flow that 
my creative practice has turned in order to see what visual resistance in the 
image-machine of control might look like. 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3.1 Control through dividuation
Deleuze’s (1995b) insights about ‘control societies’ continue to energise 
debates about the ways in which elites, and the institutional manifestation of 
their power in the organs of the State and Corporation, maintain their rule. 
There has emerged a familiar narrative about the workings of social control, 
whose major themes and tropes Bratton (2013) has summarised well: 
We have a good sense of the passage from the Foucauldian disciplinary 
biopolitics for which bodies are captured, enveloped, individuated, 
nominated, and enumerated into a governable interior, into the Deleuzian 
“society of control” for which open fields of interfaces, switches, and 
gateways quantify the traces and trails of partial subjects in motion as they 
pace through urban landscapes, wandering without tether because there is 
no outside to which they might escape.
Deleuze (1995b, 174) acknowledged that such a ‘passage’ was identified by 
Foucault himself, who ‘was actually one of the first to say that we’re moving 
away from disciplinary societies, we’ve already left them behind. We’re moving 
toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but 
through continuous control and instant communication.’ 
Debates about the nature and extent of this ‘passage’ from discipline to control 
persist. Even a cursory glance at the workings of the US prison-industrial 
complex (INCITE!; Critical Resistance, 2001) or the refugee internment 
camps in Australia’s Northern Territory or the privatised detention centres for 
asylum seekers in the UK would suggest that institutions of confinement 
continue to flourish. In part, this is the basis on which Kelly (2015) argues that 
contemporary society is but a further iteration of the disciplinary-biopolitical 
operations of power identified by Foucault. The biopolitics of today, Bratton 
(2013) suggests, is:
one that organizes its biopolitical governance through a more immediate and 
affective means: the sensing and codification of risk at the level of skin […]. 
This epidermal biopolitics is based less on “seeing like a state” than upon 
what a governing apparatus can sense.
Goodman (2012, 64) appears to concur, though understanding this as part of 
the operation of control, when he notes that ‘[v]igilant control is no longer 
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merely panoptic, but pansensory.’ To these shifts from discipline to control, 
and from panoptic to pansensory control, Lazzarato (2006) suggests must also 
be added the passage from biopolitics to noopolitics, which he characterises as 
the cognitive capture of the brain made possible by tele-technologies such as 
television and the Internet. This conception of the noopolitics of control has 
been developed most rigorously by Stiegler (1998, 2011), whose work, as 
Munster (2011, 70) notes, is ‘concerned with the over-reaching of biopower 
into what he terms “psychopower” in which contemporary technicity 
systematically captures and modulates not simply bodies but also our entire 
spectrum of attention.’
A fuller account of debates about these shifts is beyond the scope of this 
present work. It is important to note, however, that the concept of noopolitics, 
in as much as it emphasises ‘the widespread exercise, ubiquity and operation of 
information as a field of power relations at all levels of society’ (Munster 2011, 
77) and ‘involves a politics of attention and memory’ (Terranova 2007, 141), 
has served to highlight the functions of the digital screen within processes of 
cognitive capture. I return to this point later, when emphasising the need to 
address the affective dimension of control’s operations on the digital screen, 
with which my photographic and video work has been closely concerned.
Perhaps because his thesis was concerned with ‘the general breakdown of all 
sites of confinement’ (Deleuze 1995b, 178), sites whose operations Foucault 
(1995) had figured through a discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon, Deleuze 
says little about the place of the visual in control societies. Yet contemporary 
concerns about social control tend to focus on surveillance, whether by the 
State or by transnational corporations. Even prior to revelations about the 
mass data gathering conducted by the US National Security Agency’s PRISM 
programme, anxieties about surveillance have flourished. The panopticon now 
exceeds its previous sites of confinement, as Lyon (2006) suggests in detailing 
the proliferating neologisms for this sense of pervasive surveillance, among 
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which he lists the ‘synopticon’, ‘ban-opticon’, ‘nonopticon’, and ‘netopticon’, to 
which further nuance has been added by Gilbert and Goffey (2015) in their 
discussion of gendered surveillance (the ‘gynaeopticon’) and Browne (2015) in 
her exposition of racialised surveillant assemblages. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the multi-sensorial nature of contemporary 
surveillance by Bratton and Goodman among others, it is the eye of power that 
most alarms, with a pervasive infrastructure of data gathering made possible 
by digital technologies. This infrastructure is part of what Feldman (2013, 
165) characterises as the ‘actuarial gaze’, ‘a visual organization and 
institutionalization of threat perception and prophylaxis, which cross cuts 
politics, public health, public safety, policing, urban planning and media 
practice.’ It is through this gaze, Feldman (2013, 165) suggests, that ‘[a]n 
Enlightenment inspired panoptical dream of control reproduces itself in the 
dialectic of the veiling and unveiling of hazards.’ In this era of ‘networked eyes’ 
(Mitchell 2006), it would seem that the panopticon is more distributed than 
ever. In Steyerl’s (2012, 24) view, ‘new technologies have enabled the detached 
observant gaze to become ever more inclusive and all-knowing to the point of 
becoming massively intrusive – as militaristic as it is pornographic, as intense 
as extensive, both micro- and macroscopic.’ ‘[W]e are all gazing at each other 
now’, comments UK artist Jesse Darling (Clark and Farkas 2012).
Crucially, however, we are being seen as data. A defining characteristic of the 
control society is that it deals with ‘us’ as data, rather than as embodied 
subjects. As Cegłowski (2017) emphasises, it ‘is a striking fact that mass 
surveillance has been driven almost entirely by private industry’ and that the 
‘one thing these companies share is an insatiable appetite for data. [...] There 
are two interlocking motives for this data hunger: to target online advertising, 
and to train machine learning algorithms.’ Deleuze (1995b, 180) wrote that 
‘[w]e’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual. Individuals 
become “dividuals,” and masses become samples, data, markets, or “banks.”’ 
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Surveillance has become dataveillance. Best (2010, 10) explains that a 
‘dividual’ is a ‘physically embodied human subject that is endlessly divisible 
and reducible to data representations via the modern technologies of control, 
like computer-based systems’. The ‘dividual’ is a unit of control. In Franklin’s 
(2012b, 155) words, the ‘dividual describes the body that is coded in terms of 
discrete movements […] or markers of identity’, a coding which ‘presents a 
social violence that is composed not of reactionary force but of preemptive 
informatics: techniques of targeting, capture, and prediction.’ But, it should be 
noted, these techniques do also expose the data ‘dividual’ to reactionary force. 
‘We kill people based on metadata’ said General Michael Hayden, former 
director of the NSA and the CIA, at a 2014 public debate on US government 
surveillance programmes (Cole 2014).
The psychic effects of ‘dividuation’ are significant, as it ‘encourages the user to 
think of themselves as a set of partial objects, fragmented dividuals or loosely 
connected properties, collected as a time series of datapoints, and subject to 
intervention and control’ (Berry 2012, 390). For Flusser (2005, 324, cited by 
Lütticken 2013, 147) ‘the human being can no longer be seen as an individual 
but rather as the opposite, as a dense scattering of parts; he is calculable.’ The 
result is a sense of psychic fragmentation which we look to the computer 
screen to heal. Dividuation, in Berry’s (2011, 128) account, produces a 
‘minimal, decentred and fragmentary subjectivity which is unified through the 
cognitive support provided by computational devices which reconcile a 
“complete” human being.’ But, as Steyerl (2012, 168) notes, when ‘we register 
at cash tills, ATMs, and other checkpoints – as our cellphones reveal our 
slightest movements and our snapshots are tagged with GPS coordinates – we 
end up not exactly amused to death but represented to pieces.’
The ‘dividual’ of the control society is thus imbricated with visual concerns. 
That we are seen as data invites our attention to the screen, to both seek and 
create an image of the coherent self; this is the anxiety that helps drive the 
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narcissism of the selfie, whose dominance of the image-scape is such a feature 
of visual culture discourse (Mirzoeff 2016). As Munster (2006, 164) suggests, 
anxieties about dividuation have led to a ‘hyperindividuation [which] places 
the self once more at the center of a world: claiming a stake in virtual real 
estate, controlling the production of virtual game worlds, customizing 
browsers as easily as consumer preferences’, all the while ‘feeding into a 
universalist, albeit flowing and mobilizing, informatics.’
Yet, as argued in Chapter Two, the digital screen is itself an unstable site of 
representation. The dividuated subject encounters its visual corollary in the 
discretised image. Where once self-representation was securely bounded by 
the celluloid frame, the fragmented dividual now faces a pixel screen and its 
data flows. The loss of the subject and the loss of the image mirror each other 
continually. This makes the digital screen a profound site and sight of anxiety, 
an anxiety which, I will suggest, serves as a motor of the image-machine of 
control.
3.2 Visual modulation in the image-machine of control
Deleuze famously contrasted the moulding of the subject in the disciplinary 
society with the continual modulation of the dividual in the society of control. 
Modulation works at the level of the bit, the pixel, the dividual, channeling and 
arranging such discretised units in desired directions and patterns. As 
Terranova (2004, 35) suggests, modulation is intimately connected to the 
database, which has ‘helped to discriminate and exploit the smallest differences 
in tastes, timetables and orientations, bypassing altogether the self-evident, 
humanistic subject, going from masses to populations of sub-individualized 
units of information.’ In this way, identities such as those of gender, race and 
sexuality are ‘reduced to recombinable elements, disassociated from their 
subjects and recomposed on a plane of modulation - a close sampling of the 
micromutations of the social, moving to the rhythm of market expansions and 
contractions’ (Terranova 2004, 35).
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This conception of modulation is fundamentally posthumanist, privileging 
‘informational pattern over material instantiation’ such that consciousness is 
properly understood as an ‘epiphenomenon’ Hayles (1999, 2). Modulation 
does not work at the level of the consciousness of the humanist subject, but at 
the sub-individual level (e.g. of sensation and excitation) and at the supra-
individual level (e.g. of collective affinities, groups, networks). The concept of 
modulation relies on an ontology of singularities and multiplicities below and 
beyond the humanist subject, which is at the heart of Deleuze’s philosophical 
project (Deleuze 1994; Rajchman 2000) and which, when used with Guattari, 
was central to their analysis of capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 1983; 1987).
Deleuze’s conception of modulation was influenced by Simondon’s (2005) 
ontology of becoming, which understood materiality as fundamentally 
processual, in a ‘condition of ongoing immanent transformation’ (Hui 2015, 
76). For Simondon (2005), modulation referred simply to the ongoing process 
of becoming, but Deleuze uses it to highlight the purposeful amplifications and 
aggregations of singularities into multiplicities that are meaningful to the 
Corporation and State alike. Modulation in the society of control involves 
processes of ‘affective capture’ (Terranova 2004, 140) that work through the 
operation of ‘certain measures and constraints’ (Hui 2015, 80). This is the basis 
of what Terranova (2004, 25) characterises as ‘soft control’, concerned with 
‘known probabilities within the constraints set up by the interplay of code and 
channel or medium.’ As she (2004, 108) points out, it ‘is not soft because it is 
less harsh (often it has nothing gentle about it) but because it is an experiment 
in the control of systems that respond violently and often suicidally to rigid 
control.’ Such systems ‘must be modulated with a minimum of amount of force’ 
(Terranova 2004, 108).
Control operates in an unstable materiality of manifold singularities, seeking 
through modulation to form manageable multiplicities for purposes of profit 
and social order; it is ‘a diagram of power that takes as its operational field the 
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productive capacities of the hyperconnected many’ (Terranova 2004, 100). The 
significance of this understanding of modulation becomes apparent when we 
return to the screen as the scene of control. For while extensive theoretical 
work has been done on the role of the digital screen within the operations of 
social control, much of it defaults to notions of consciousness and implicitly 
humanist subjectivity. 
This is clear in the theorising of the contemporary attention economy, whether 
from a behaviourist economics perspective (Murray et al. 2015) or inflected by 
Marxist analyses of real subsumption (Virno 2004; Beller 2012). The latter 
regard social media as the latest and most pervasive iteration of the ‘social 
factory’, in which the human subject, though apparently exercising their free 
will, is in fact labouring at the screen, producing surplus value for Google, 
Facebook and the internet’s other ‘factory owners’. From a very different 
perspective, indebted to Heidegger (2010), Stiegler (1998) has looked at the 
digital screen as the site of computational technologies that, in Munster’s 
(2011, 75) account, ‘capture, control and modulate the neuro-informational 
circuits of human behaviour, especially dominant in the spheres of marketing 
and education but increasingly inhabiting and imperializing thought conceived 
as a broad cultural activity.’ But as Hansen (2012, 62) makes clear, Stiegler’s 
noopolitics of computationality, made manifest on the digital screen, still relies 
on a notion of human consciousness, ignoring the ways in which ‘media impact 
the domain of worldly sensibility prior to, and indeed as a necessary condition 
for, impacting our higher order experience.’
If we are to understand the digital screen as the scene of modulation, it is to 
the processes of ‘affective capture’ and the ‘measures and constraints’ that 
channel singularities into manageable multiplicities that we must pay more 
attention. Terranova (2004, 144) affirms this point in discussing ‘the image 
ecology of network culture’, whose politics, she (Terranova 2004, 142) argues, 
are ‘no longer a matter of illusion or deception, but of the tactical and strategic 
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deployment of the power of affection of images as such.’ Drawing on 
Baudrillard’s (1983) conception of contemporary life as a condition of semiotic 
saturation, Terranova (2004, 152) suggests that the potency of images lies less 
in their cognitive impact than their affective intensity, for what ‘we actually 
come to perceive consciously is only a fraction of what has touched us.’ For the 
image, what ‘seems to matter is the kind of affect that it packs, the movements 
that it receives, inhibits and/or transmits’ (Terranova 2004, 142).
The political function of the image, then, within the computational 
infrastructures of soft control is related to its ‘power of inducing perceptions 
and organizing the imagination, of establishing a subjective correspondence 
between images, percepts, affects and beliefs’ (Terranova 2004, 152). But such 
power is inherently unstable; at the level of affect, there is always an excess of 
bodily sensation and excitation before and beyond consciousness (Massumi 
2002). The informational ‘leakiness’ of the digital image, discussed in Chapter 
Two, is compounded by its affective excess, which Munster (2006, 140) refers 
to as the digital image’s potential for ‘informatic affect’.
Affect, I am aware, is contested ground, with differing views on its meaning 
and uses (Gorton 2007; Seigworth and Gregg 2010). As Ngai (2005, 26-27) 
makes clear, the distinction between emotion and affect is a matter of 
‘distinguishing first-person from third-person feeling, and, by extension, 
feeling that is contained by an identity from feeling that is not.’ It is this notion 
of affect, as that which precedes and exceeds the consciousness of the 
humanist subject, which I find most useful in relation to this discussion of 
modulation, control and the screen. Terranova (2004, 152) writes that the 
‘whole body is filled by the vibrations produced by the impact of images on 
sensory organs, including eyes, ears and skin’, vibrations which induce 
‘autonomic bodily remainders’ and thus a sense of ‘unrealized, or virtual, 
potentials’, a ‘field of intensity’ that may yet become ‘a site of emergence for 
another mode of politics’.  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Affect is both sub-individual, at the level of bodily sensation and autonomic 
reaction, and supra-individual, at the level of ambient mood and collective 
feeling; that is, affect is concerned with singularities and (potential) 
multiplicities. Goodman (2012, 189) notes that ‘unlike an emotional state, 
affective tonality possesses, abducts, or envelops a subject rather than being 
possessed by one.’ Puar (2012, 63) is clear that ‘societies of control tweak and 
modulate bodies as matter, not predominantly through signification or identity 
interpellation but rather through affective capacities and tendencies.’ 
The digital screen is the scene of affective encounter with the anxieties 
produced by informatisation: the psychic anxieties of the dividuated subject 
and collective anxiety in the face of the apparent dematerialisation of the ‘real 
world’. We make and look to the images on our screens in response to this 
anxiety, from the selfies that seek a coherent self to the locative media that 
seeks a reliable position on stable ground. In this sense, the digital image 
operates as ‘affective capture’, inciting our interactivity with the screen and 
with the algorithms of ‘measures and constraints’ that channel dividuated 
singularities into patterns of data (as a multiplicity) that are meaningful to and 
manageable by the Corporation and the State.
But, notes Hansen (2004, 7-8), ‘affectivity’ is also ‘the capacity of the body to 
experience itself as “more than itself” and thus to deploy its sensorimotor 
power to create the unpredictable, the experimental, the new.’ I return to the 
political potential of this visual remainder and affective excess in Chapter 
Four, with my discussion of the vibrational ontology of the interface, and in 
Chapter Five, with my video works look screen and moving still, and their 
exploration of this vibrational potential to disrupt the operations of control.
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3.3 The circulation-image of control
It is in relation to this discussion of affective capture and affective excess that I 
find Franklin’s (2015) concept of the ‘program image’ useful. For the digital 
image, ‘[e]ach significant change in the image is directed not only at the 
construction of a specific mode of perception, but also at the motivation of 
some form of input - a mouse click, a keystroke, or a button press’ (Franklin 
2015, 164). The digital image ‘is always aimed at motivating user action’; it is a 
‘program image, an image that at once executes and is executable’ (Franklin 
2015, 164). 
Far from the alienated passivity induced by the televisual commodification of 
the image identified by Debord (1970), the digital image is a stimulant to 
interactivity with the image-machine. As Cegłowski (2017) makes clear, this 
image-machine is part of ‘an apparatus for harvesting tremendous quantities of 
data from people, and a set of effective but opaque learning algorithms we 
train on this data.’ The image on the digital screen is bound up with algorithms 
that ‘learn to show people the things they are most likely to ‘engage’ with—
click, share, view, and react to’ Cegłowski (2017) notes. Echoing my earlier 
discussion of the digital image as operating an ‘affective capture’, Cegłowski 
(2017) stresses that such algorithms are ‘very good at provoking these 
reactions from people.’
This concept of the ‘program image’ also refines Flusser’s (2000, 2011) analysis 
of the photographic apparatus, whose black-boxed algorithms programme 
photography. Recognising ourselves as programmed by the image-machine is 
necessary, according to Flusser, if we are to glimpse a liberatory practice of 
making and using images. Contemporary life is an image-scape of what Flusser 
(2011, 10) defines as ‘technical images, a computed universe in which particles 
are assembled into visible images.’ The logic underpinning this universe of 
technical images is that of control. As Flusser (2011, 10) suggests, this 
‘emerging universe, this dimensionless, imagined universe of technical images, 
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is meant to render our circumstances conceivable, representable, and 
comprehensible’. Crucially for Flusser, the images in such a universe are in a 
sense already taken, programmed by the algorithmic ‘apparatus’ of the camera, 
itself programmed by the requirements of power. ‘Power has moved from the 
owner of objects to the programmer and the operator’ according to Flusser 
(2000, 30), meaning that ‘the freedom of the photographer remains a 
programmed freedom’ (Flusser 2000, 35).
Given this programming, the question remains as to what strategies of visual 
resistance, or in Flusser’s terms ‘visual freedom’, might look like. Flusser 
(2000, 80) himself hailed the ‘experimental photographer’, able to ‘outwit the 
camera's rigidity’ by ‘smuggl[ing] human intentions into its program that are 
not predicted by it’ and ‘forc[ing] the camera to create the unpredictable, the 
improbable, the informative.’ But where Flusser saw the programming of the 
apparatus as determining the kinds of images that are taken, whose algorithms 
the ‘experimental photographer’ must ‘outwit’, the function of the ‘program 
image’ within the image-machine of control is, more fundamentally, to incite 
the ‘user’ to participate in the imagistic flow and keep the data moving. 
Thus, appeals to heroic acts of visual resistance, whether by Flusser’s 
‘experimental photographer’ or the often celebrated ‘hacker’ (Wark 2015), 
should be treated with caution, for this view of resistance ignores dividuation. 
As Franklin (2012b, 156) notes, such a view of resistance preserves:
a connection with the Romanticist notion of the individual or group that is 
undercut by the predominance of the dividual and the data bank 
characteristic of control societies, and that places their viability as a base for 
effective political critique in doubt. 
Steyerl’s (2014, 37) project of ‘circulationism’, to which I referred at the end of 
the previous chapter, speaks more clearly to what is involved in disrupting the 
operations of such ‘program images’. As I suggested in Chapter Two, what 
remains of the image, under conditions of computationality, for a visual 
activism that would challenge the operations of control is less its 
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representational efficacy than its fluid instability. To emphasise this, and with 
an echo of Steyerl, the image-machine of control, I suggest, operates through 
‘circulation-images’, in the dual sense that the digital image is both constituted 
by and productive of data flows.
That ‘[n]ow and for the foreseeable future, images are a sub-genre of 
machines’, as Bratton (2013) suggests, may thus be understood in a very 
specific sense. The function of the image-machine in this circulation is to 
constitute ‘us’ as inputs with the appearance of agency. The ‘machinic form of 
value accomplishes what the exchange of commodities cannot: it constitutes 
bodies as conscious (self)-representations coordinated through the technical 
arrangement of economic processes’, suggests Dienst (1994, 48). The image-
machine of control constitutes us as photographic ‘agents’ through its 
mechanisms of affective capture, in order to stimulate data input into the 
algorithms of measure and constraint that modulate unstable systems 
(composed of singularities) into manageable patterns and movements. It is to 
these conditions of imagistic flow that my creative practice has turned in order 
to see what visual resistance in the image-machine of control might look like.
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4. Between Faces, Facing Between
The screening of digital images, and the informatisation they represent, 
generates an affect of insecurity which we look to and act on our screens to 
resolve through (self-)representations that are themselves inherently unstable. 
But every use of the screen risks refining the algorithmic interpolations of the 
surveillant-consumption assemblage of 21st century capitalism, further 
intensifying its anxious affect. The digital screen and its circulation-images are 
visual components of an infrastructure of control, whose patternings of light 
incite an interactivity with its computational surface that energises circuits of 
data whose flows pattern and modulate us.
Chapter Four details my turn to the digital-visual interface, being the organic-
machinic encounter with the screen, to engage with the dynamics of the 
imagistic flow. Drawing on theorising of the fluid dynamics of the interface, I 
discuss the implications of seeing the interface as a dynamic boundary 
condition whose turbulence of data flows may open up ‘lines of flight’ from the 
striated grid of control. In as much as they are visual, these lines of flight help 
us see and be beyond the workings of the faciality system, and the subject-
object relations of the gaze within which so much work on visuality and power 
has been confined.
I look to the digital-visual interface as a threshold condition of becoming, in 
which we may experience a visual relation that vibrates between but is 
irreducible to the points of self/subject and other/object. The interface 
constitutes a moment-site of encounter with the circulations and rhythms of 
the image-machine of control that is, at the same time, an affective experience 
of the potential for other rhythms and different flows. Theorising the interface 
in terms of its fluid dynamics and vibrational ontology opens up this potential 
to interrupt the rhythms of the circulation-image of control. 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4.1 Looking for resistance in the faciality system
Modulation works through a logic of discretisation and aggregation, patterning 
data in order to track, predict and direct its movements toward maximal return 
on, and minimal risk to, capitalism. Chapter Three looked at the role of 
visuality within this algorithmic interpolation of the dividuated data subject, 
and in particular the digital screen and its images as a surface of anxiety to 
which we are affectively and effectively attached. If affect names the feeling of 
feeling, that which is felt before being named and owned by the subject, then it 
opens a way to grasping the visual operations of modulation that does not 
route through a humanist insistence on subjectivity and consciousness to 
which theories of cognitive capture and attention economies remain attached.
But the affective imbrication of anxiety and insecurity with the visual 
operations of contemporary social control is differentially distributed, and so 
too the interest in the political utility of (self-)representations for those 
rendered less visual, if not necessarily less visible, by political subjugation. 
Experience of contemporary social control has an intensity that feels different 
depending on where the patterning of data positions you. It is not enough to 
note simply the ontological affects of the informatisation of the image and the 
imaged under conditions of ubiquitous computation. The anxiety and 
insecurity that are the affective ambience of the circulation-image, and its 
modulatory operations within the image-machine of control, have always been 
felt more intensely by those subjected to the mastery of other people’s vision.
Vision has long been associated with mastery. Haraway (1988, 581) writes:
The eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity - honed to perfection 
in the history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male 
supremacy - to distance the knowing subject from everybody and 
everything in the interests of unfettered power.
This is to say that the vision of mastery and the mastery of vision have long 
been imbricated with hierarchies of power, multiply structured by differential 
relations of oppression. Any project or practice of the visual that seeks to be 
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liberatory must engage with these relations and hierarchies. It is beyond the 
scope of this current work to thoroughly review the vast literature on, and long 
history of activist struggles against, the misogynist, racist and homophobic 
gaze of power, which have been such a feature of work on cinema and 
photography, and visual culture more generally. Psychoanalytic (Mulvey 1975; 
Kristeva 1981; Doane 1982; Irigaray 1985; Pollock 1988; Silverman 1992) and, 
to a lesser extent, phenomenological (Dudley 1978; Stern 1979; de Lauretis 
1987; Sobchack 1991) accounts of the misogyny of the gaze were particularly 
influential in theoretical work on cinema and photography in the 1970s and 
1980s. Such accounts were later critiqued and developed by work on the racist 
gaze in visual media, and the visual imbrications of white and male supremacy 
(hooks 1992; Julien and Mercer 1996; Fleetwood 2011), together with 
attention to homo/trans-phobic scopic regimes (Sedgwick 1990; Phelan 1996; 
Halberstam 2005; Puar 2007). 
From this rich and varied legacy of theoretical work, it is important to 
acknowledge both the persistence of, and complications with, issues around 
spectatorship, as the right to look, and self-representation, as the right to 
control one’s image. Asserting control over the image, and reclaiming one’s 
image from the gaze of the ‘master’, has never been more possible as a result of 
the democratisation of image-making made possible by digital technologies. 
But such claims for visual subjectivity remain fraught in the context of the 
image-machine of computational capitalism. 
A political strategy of claiming visibility in the context of ‘capital-intensified 
sight’ (Virilio 1987) is necessarily problematic. In Steyerl’s (2012, 166) words 
‘[w]ithin a fully immersive media landscape, pictorial representation - which 
was seen as a prerogative and a political privilege for a long time - feels more 
like a threat.’ For Steyerl (2012, 50), ‘being a subject can be tricky. The subject 
is always already subjected. Though the position of the subject suggests a 
degree of control, its reality is rather one of being subjected to power 
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relations.’ As Balsom (2017) notes, ‘[e]xposure is violent; it makes the 
surveilled subject vulnerable to capture by apparatuses of power.’ ‘The 
subaltern speaks, and somewhere an algorithm listens’, Galloway (2012, 137) 
reminds us.
Being not seen or less visible may sometimes be a preferable political strategy. 
Fleetwood (2011, 24) emphasises that ‘opacity also provides possibility for 
black subjects.’ In Phelan’s (1996, 6) summation, ‘[v]isibility is a trap […]; it 
summons surveillance and the law; it provokes voyeurism, fetishism, the 
colonialist/imperial appetite for possession. Yet it retains a certain political 
appeal.’ As she (Phelan 1996, 7) continues:
While […] under-represented communities can be empowered by an 
enhanced visibility, the terms of this visibility often enervate the putative 
power of these identities. A much more nuanced relationship to the power 
of visibility needs to be pursued than the Left currently engages.
This more nuanced relationship must include a clearer recognition of our 
posthumanist condition, and the political possibilities opened up by a de-
centering of the humanist subject, implicitly or explicitly regarded as white, 
Western and male. The feminism of Haraway’s (1991; Puar 2012) cyborgs and 
Afrofuturism’s (Eshun 2003) challenge to white supremacy share this 
posthumanist acknowledgement of the exclusions and oppressions on which 
the humanist subject has been predicated. 
Deleuze and Guattari laid important groundwork for this posthumanist 
politics in their discussion of the ‘faciality’ system, and it is with this system 
that claims for visual subjectivity, especially those made by marginalised 
‘subjects’, must reckon. The faciality system is organised around ‘the 
almightiness of the signifier as well as the autonomy of the subject’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 181), whose primacy Deleuze and Guattari trace to the 
assemblages of power constituting European colonialism and industrial 
capitalism. At the centre of facialisation is the humanist subject, male and 
white. As they (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 292) write, ‘[t]he faciality function 
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showed us the form under which man constitutes the majority, or rather the 
standard upon which the majority is based: white, male, adult, “rational,” etc., 
in short, the average European, the subject of enunciation.’ 
The majoritarian gaze of the faciality function, the misogynist, racist and 
homophobic gaze of power, is a dualism ‘machine’, whose central function is 
one ‘of reproducing itself in the principal term of the opposition’ just as ‘the 
entire opposition at the same time resonates in the central point’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 292). This faciality function organises power relations, and the 
visual relations which express and are expressed by them, in a series of 
binaries, of self/other and subject/object, in which the second, subordinate 
term is organised by the first and dominant. Claims for visual subjectivity 
based on self-representation, that do not interrogate the functions of 
subjectivity and representation within relations of power, risk remaining 
confined by the binary regulations of this ‘faciality’ system. 
The damaging effects of this dualism machine on the prospects of liberation for 
those currently subordinated by the majoritarian gaze have been highlighted 
by theorists and activists fighting misogyny, racism and homophobia. Chow 
has questioned whether the marginalised subject is still a viable site from 
which to act politically, much less whether the subject is a necessary precursor 
for politics (Chow 2006, cited by Puar 2012). As Puar (2012, 55) emphasises, 
‘[p]art of Chow’s concern is that poststructuralist efforts to attend to the 
specificity of Others has become a universalizing project that is always 
beholden to the self-referentiality of the “center”’. Claiming visual subjectivity 
from the position of the ‘other’ within the binary logic of the faciality system 
risks reaffirming the centrality of the majoritarian gaze by which the other is 
defined and positioned.
How might this dualism machine of the faciality function be contested as a 
mode of resistance to the image-machine of control? If the binary operation of 
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the image-machine positions us as the faces of either self or other, subject or 
object, I have turned to the interface as an unstable position between faces, 
that is also a facing between. In the interface we may experience a visual 
relation that vibrates between but is irreducible to the points of self/subject 
and other/object.
In my turn to the interface as this ‘in-between’, I seek to immerse my visual 
practice in the folded topology of informational capitalism, which destabilises 
the time-space of distance that separates here and there, now and then, subject 
and object. Far from relying on claims for control over acts and objects of 
looking, as settled subject/object poles within visual relations, any challenge to 
the image-machine of control must reckon with what might be thought of as a 
superposition of lookings. To invoke this quantum metaphor is to insist on a 
foundational instability and indeterminacy, a ‘vibrational ontology’ in 
Goodman’s (2012, 83) suggestive phrasing: ‘If we subtract human perception, 
everything moves. Anything static is so only at the level of perceptibility. At 
the molecular or quantum level, everything is in motion, is vibrating.’
4.2 Interface concerns
My visual practice, concerned with resistance to the modulatory operations of 
the image-machine of control, explores this vibrational ontology of lookings. 
To do so, it takes the interface, human-machine and eye-screen, as its site-
moment for critical artistic intervention, premised on a view of the interface as 
a social and not merely technological condition. ‘[T]he machines don’t explain 
anything, you have to analyze the collective arrangements of which the 
machines are just one component’, emphasised Deleuze (1995a, 175). 
To understand the interface in relation to the scopic assemblage of control, I 
have, following Deleuze, looked beyond the screen as the ‘machinic’ surface or 
frame with which to theorise and organise my practice. For while it is still true 
that ‘we clearly live in the society of the screen’ (Manovich 2001, 114), viewing 
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the screen as the focus of critical work on the interface constrains the political 
possibilities of such work. However it is viewed, as frame, surface, mirror, or 
window, taking the screen-as-object instantiates a viewer-as-subject, thus 
rendering the interface a binary relation between two established forms. 
The dominant paradigm for this binary relation, Munster (2006, 21) suggests 
in her discussion of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), and the ways in 
which both designers and artists have responded to the screens that mediate 
such interaction, is what she terms ‘interfacial’. She notes the ways in which 
this interfacial paradigm for the interface invokes particular subjectivations, 
being the particular ‘position that the human subject assumes or becomes’ 
when face-to-face with the screen (Munster 2006, 122). But Deleuze and 
Guattari’s critique of the faciality system, when applied to the human-
computer interface, invites not merely a questioning of the particular kinds of 
subjectivations invoked by the screen but of a humanist subjectivity itself, 
reinstated by a focus on the screen. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the faciality system organises thought and action 
around the humanist subject, as both the subject of discourse and of 
consciousness. Accounts of the human-computer interface that emphasise the 
surface of the screen, the interplay between its surfaces and depths, and its 
‘face-to-face’ encounter with the ‘surface’ of the humanist subject, are but the 
most recent update of this faciality system. As such, the politics of framing the 
interface in terms of ‘bouncing back and forth between the surfaces of new 
technologies and those of our own skin’ (Munster 2006, 138) remain 
unaddressed. 
The political move I seek to make in my creative work at the interface is to 
explore it as a site-moment of opening and indeterminacy as a way to disrupt 
the closed, insistent data flows of the circulation-image. We may sense the 
interface as indeterminate when we see the digital-visual encounter not in 
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terms of a binary relation between self and screen, but as the time-space of that 
encounter itself. As Galloway makes clear (2012, 54):
While readily evident in things like screens and surfaces, the interface is 
ultimately something beyond the screen. It has only a superficial 
relationship to the surfaces of digital devices, those skins that beg to be 
touched. Rather, the interface is a general technique of mediation […].
So long as we remain confined by a view of the interface as a meeting of 
surfaces, we instantiate the screen-surface as object to the viewer/user-surface 
as subject, thus rendering the interface a binary relation between two 
established forms. 
Yet the politics of the interface are to be found not in its forms but its formings. 
As Hookway (2014, 14) suggests, ’a surface presents a form, while an interface 
performs a shaping.’ Theorising the interface remains central to the task of 
understanding the image-machine of control, but as process not object. In 
Galloway’s (2012, 33) words, ‘an interface is not a thing, an interface is always 
an effect. It is always a process or translation.’ Crucial to this processual view 
of the interface, and therein the glimpses it affords of modes of resistance to 
scopic control, is its rejection of the face-to-face encounters privileged by the 
faciality system. The point of such resistance is not to stage an alternative 
encounter between established forms, between the viewer/user-as-subject and 
the screen/surface-as-object, but to be in the interface as a forming, wherein 
new formations become possible. The ways in which I have used photography 
and video to explore the openness and indeterminacy of the interface are 
discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
4.3 Forming interfaces
Focusing my creative practice on the digital-visual interface necessarily 
involves consideration of interactivity, often taken to be a defining quality of 
the digital and its ‘new media’. For Rush (2005, 183), ‘“[i]nteractive” has 
emerged as the most inclusive term to describe the type of art of the digital 
age.’ For present purposes, of interest is the politics of the interface constituted 
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by this discourse of digital interactivity: the interface is rendered as the scene 
and mechanism of an individuated empowerment. Touching the ‘skin’ of the 
screen is taken to be acting in the world, and the augmentation of personal 
mastery afforded by the screen has been at the heart of the marketing of digital 
technologies and the promise of a digitally-enhanced life. The interface is seen 
as an experience of enhanced personal control over the digitised world.
But the digital screen is a screening off of algorithmic control. Chun (2011, 60) 
emphasises that ‘the interface is “haunted” by processes hidden by our 
seemingly transparent GUIs that make us even more vulnerable online, from 
malicious “back doors” to mundane data gathering systems’. By exposing the 
‘user’ to a ‘system of causal pleasure’ (Chun 2011, 18), based on a ‘logic of 
governing or steering through the increasingly complex world around 
us’ (Chun 2011, 9), we are invited to embrace ‘the resurgence of the seemingly 
sovereign individual, the subject driven to know, driven to map, to zoom in 
and out, to manipulate, and to act’ (Chun 2011, 8). Crucially, however, ‘by 
interacting with these interfaces, we are also mapped: data-driven machine 
learning algorithms process our collective data traces in order to discover 
underlying patterns’ (Chun 2011, 9).
The structure of the interface is fundamentally ambivalent. This ambivalence 
of feeling both powerfully served, and served up to power, by our screens is 
primarily portrayed as a visual experience of the interplay between 
transparency and opacity. ‘[A]s our interfaces become more “transparent” and 
visual, our machines also become more dense and obscure’, Chun (2011, 
176-177) stresses. This ambivalence, as Chapter Three discussed, is part of the 
anxious affect of the circulation-image, so central to the visual operations of 
control. The affective anxiety of the circulation-image is linked to its demand 
for interactivity. Rush (2005, 220) notes that ‘[o]ne cannot remain static with 
the interactive Web screen’ as ‘it will simply shut down once the Web carrier 
decides the user has been inactive too long. […] The only way to avoid the 
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forced closure is to keep clicking on more hyperlinks and risk forgetting where 
one started in the first place.’ Lütticken (2013, 181) sees this insistence on 
interactivity as part of a broader entrenchment of the ‘feedback principle’ so 
central to the cybernetic thinking discussed in Chapter Three, in which ‘we are 
continuously encouraged to offer feedback in politics and in online stores, in 
museums and in the workplace, making these various contexts and 
environments more fun, more interactive.’ 
As Lütticken (2013, 159) makes clear, ‘[b]y now, (inter)active engagement has 
become an essential element of our “gamified” cultural economy, raising 
serious doubts about the contemporary relevance of the whole intellectual 
tradition that sought to activate the spectator.’ Activating the spectator has 
become central to the operation of control, in societies in which ‘labor is 
marked by the inability to distinguish between labor and leisure, between 
work and occupation, between working hours and free time - between 
performance and life’ (Lütticken 2013, 195). In this context, Lütticken (2013, 
181) suggests, ‘[i]t is not the Situationist theory and (proposed) praxis of play 
that has shaped the networked society of control, but the game theory that 
emerged in the sphere of cybernetics.’
Working with and at the interface in ways that contest this cybernetic 
insistence on interactivity means recognising, as Hookway (2014, 16) 
proposes, that ‘the interface is more than a theory of interactivity, especially if 
interaction is viewed as a mediated interplay between stable and self-sovereign 
entities (e.g., human and machine, designer and artefact, user and control 
system).’ Rather than an encounter between forms, between humanist subject 
and computational software, mediated by the screen, the interface is a forming 
through encounters. The political possibilities of the interface lie not in its 
altering of a pre-existing subject’s consciousness, but in reconstituting 
subjectivity itself. ‘[I]nteraction produces its elements, whether human or 
machine’, Hookway (2014, 16) emphasises. Echoing the insistence on the 
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processual nature of the interface, Hookway develops a theoretically rich 
account of this process in terms of its fluidity, which in turn has done much to 
inform my creative practice. 
The term “interface”, Hookway reminds us, was coined by the engineer James 
Thomson in his influential work on fluid dynamics in the nineteenth century. 
He used the term to denote a dynamic boundary condition in the encounter 
between different fluid bodies, and ‘as a boundary condition it would be 
inherently active’, being ‘the site of both continuous contestation and the 
resolution of competing pressures’ (Hookway 2014, 59). ‘From its emergence 
within fluid dynamics, the interface would take on a conceptual affinity with 
fluidity that extends to all of its subsequent contexts and instantiations’, 
Hookway (2014, 59) notes. Chapter Three discussed these instantiations in 
terms of the modulatory operations of computational capitalism. As Munster 
(2006, 13) emphasises, the ‘digital is a flow of information, technologies, 
cultural and social deployments, potentialities, delimitations and regulations.’ 
The impact of computationality on capitalism has been to accelerate its myriad 
flows, and the tracking, managing and channeling of such flows is central to 
the operations of control. The function of the circulation-image, as outlined in 
Chapter Three, is to incite our interactivity with the screen, generating the 
data flows on which the modulatory operations of control depend. In turn, as 
Feldman (2013, 168) suggests, the scopic regime of control also deploys the 
‘arresting power of optical technology to stabilize image flows, to freeze 
temporalities of urban and global circulation, [which] is conjoined with legal 
and militarized powers of arrest and apprehension.’ Figuring the fluidity of the 
digital-visual interface as a dynamic boundary condition of machinic and 
organic flows affords useful ways to see and work with the interface as 
moment-site for critical engagement with the circuits and cuts, the movements 
and arrests, of the image-machine of control.
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4.4 Interfaces of (potential) resistance
The interface is a boundary condition, a threshold, and as such, is a folding of 
interiority and exteriority, inside and outside. It is both a ‘between faces’ and a 
‘facing between’. Between faces, the interface can be said to describe an 
enclosure. Facing between, an interface ‘would suggest a boundary or zone of 
encounter that actively extends into and conditions that which it 
separates’ (Hookway 2014, 9).
The interface, as a folding of outside and inside, offers a way to work visually 
with the implications of the folded topology of computational capitalism, 
which, in my creative practice, I have explored through the photomontage of 
medium specific, discussed in Section 5.3.1. Informatisation, as Chapter Two 
discussed, is undermining the potential for visual resistance to capitalism when 
such resistance relies on a logic and aesthetic of counter-representation; in the 
folds of informational space, the ground of perspectival representation is lost. 
Yet the folds of the interface, its encompassing of interiority and exteriority, 
may provide glimpses of an outside inside.
As a dynamic boundary condition, the digital-visual interface is also a 
turbulent encounter of machinic and organic flows. The radical potential of the 
interface is its turbulence, its moment-site of indeterminacy. My video works, 
look screen and moving still, which are discussed in the next chapter, explore this 
turbulence in relation to the vibrational ontology of the interface. This sense of 
vibration is central to the experience of the interface as a dynamic threshold. 
As a zone or form of relation, the interface ‘is a liminal or threshold condition 
that both delimits the space for a kind of inhabitation and opens up otherwise 
unavailable phenomena, conditions, situations, and territories for exploration, 
use, participation and exploitation’ (Hookway 2014, 5). The interface as an 
opening up is key to its critical, radical potential, as well as its occasion for the 
operations of control.
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The turbulence of the interface, then, reflects the far-from-equilibrium 
conditions of open and productive systems, toward the management of which 
the techniques and technologies of ‘soft control’ are directed. The modulatory 
operations of societies of control are based on an understanding, as Terranova 
(2004, 121) suggests, of ‘all social, technical and economic structures that are 
characterised by a distributed and dynamic interaction of large numbers of 
entities with no central controller in charge.’ If a defining trope of the era of 
control, as discussed in Chapter Three, is that of there being ‘no outside’, 
whether understood as capitalism’s real subsumption of life or in relation to 
cybernetic systems theorising of the computable world, the interface has 
become a central figure for understanding and managing the far-from-
equilibrium conditions and systems of algorithmic capitalism. The interface, 
then, is always the problem of control. As Terranova (2004, 122) makes clear, 
the ‘problem of contemporary modes of control is to steer the spontaneous 
activities of such systems to plateaus that are desirable and preferable.’
Figuring the instability of systems in terms of fluidity and the exertion of 
control as ‘steering’ are fundamental to the cybernetic logic which informs the 
society of control, as outlined in Chapter Three. ‘The society of control is in 
fact cybernetics in action’, Lütticken (2013, 181) proposes. In coining the term 
‘cybernetics’, from the Greek kubernetes or steersman, Wiener (1961) cited 
Maxwell’s 1868 paper On Governors, which described the design and operation 
of feedback and control mechanisms in fluid dynamics, noting that ‘governor’ 
is derived from a Latin corruption of kubernetes (Hookway 2014, 98). At the 
same time, fluid dynamics has been used to figure the potential for freedom, 
the potential to escape control. 
The turbulence of the fluid as a space of creativity was central to the 
philosophical work of Serres (1982) on the possibility of freedom, which he 
associated with indeterminacy at the atomic level - ‘the clinamen, or swerve, of 
atoms in unexpected directions’ (Hookway 2014, 91). For Serres, the ‘swerve 
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is a distinctly fluid property; it is aligned with turbulence and the vortex as it is 
with chaos’ (Hookway 2014, 98), the properties which Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, 479) associated with the sea, as ‘a smooth space par excellence’ whose 
turbulence opens up ‘lines of flight’ (swerves) from capitalism’s control. The 
strength of Serres’ work, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 489) note, is that ‘it 
demonstrates this link between the clinamen as a generative differential 
element, and the formation of vortices and turbulences insofar as they occupy 
an engendered smooth space.’ 
Even in the age of the Cloud, fluidity remains a useful trope for seeing the 
interface as a site-moment for contesting control, for what is a cloud but 
condensed water. Indeed, as ‘a form of mediation, a representation of 
immateriality and smoothness that both effects and obscures the functions of a 
structured, striated grid’ of computational control (Franklin 2012a, 458), the 
Cloud, in a sense, condenses into control what the interface keeps open: the 
encounter between the contingency of smooth space and the constraints of the 
striated grid. In the Cloud, smoothness is reduced to the surface of the screen 
which hides the computational power of control. 
As Franklin (2012a, 456) makes clear, ‘cloud computing extends the artificially 
transparent, frictionless logic of the software interface by making permanent 
connectivity a primary service’, a permanent connectivity which ensures ‘the 
spread of the logic of informatic capture, command, and control over the entire 
world so that it conceptually conditions and transforms bodies’ (Franklin 
2012a, 460). It is just in this way that we might read the theorisation of the 
digital-visual interface as the screen from which screen labour can be 
extracted, for ‘the interface constitutes the site where a dynamic process of 
forming may become visible, legible, knowable, measurable, and available for 
capture in the production of work’ (Hookway 2014, 63).
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Resisting such ‘informatic capture, command, and control’ requires a return to 
the interface as a dynamic, fluid threshold. Although the interface has become 
a critical site for the exertion of control, its inherent instability means that it ‘is 
not reducible to control, even as control implicitly seeks out the interface as 
underdeveloped territory to be explored and colonized’ (Hookway 2014, 11). 
The challenge for my work has been to explore the interface differently, not 
toward its colonisation, but with a commitment to its openings and formings 
that remain elusive to capture. 
This contrast between form and shaping echoes Deleuze’s (1992, 4) distinction 
between disciplinary ‘molds’ and the modulations that operate in the society of 
control, a distinction which emphasised that ‘[e]nclosures are molds, distinct 
castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will 
continuously change from one moment to the other.’ The interface, then, as 
that which ‘performs a shaping’ is an important place to work against the 
operations of visual modulation. To do so, I have used haptic photography as a 
way to feel my way into the smooth, opened space of the interface, a practice 
which I discuss in more depth in Section 5.3.2 in relation to my photographic 
work on figure ground, surface gaze and touch light.
4.5 Toward a vibrational ontology of the interface
My exploration of the interface as a time-space of openings and formings that 
remain elusive to capture and resistant to control has been guided by an 
understanding of its vibrational ontology. In part, this is rooted in the 
theorising of the interface, discussed in the previous section, in terms of the 
fluid dynamics of a threshold condition, characterised by turbulence and 
instability, in which a generative potential for the new inheres. But the notion 
of the digital-visual interface as ontogenetic vibration can also be traced to 
Bergson’s (2004) influential writings on time, duration and the creative 
potential of the virtual.  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Hansen (2004) makes extensive use of Bergson in his suggestive theorising of 
the affectivity of the digital image and its liberatory potential. In terms that 
recall Galloway’s (2012) understanding of the interface as processual, as 
dynamic event not static object, Hansen (2004, 10) emphasises that ‘the image 
can no longer be restricted to the level of surface appearance, but must be 
extended to encompass the entire process by which information is made 
perceivable through embodied experience.’ 
Bergson (2004, 176) explains his celebrated account of duration thus:
The essence of time is that it goes by; time already gone by is the past, and 
we call the present the instant in which it goes by. [...] But the real, 
concrete, live present - that of which I speak when I speak of my present 
perception - that present necessarily occupies a duration.
For Hansen, the visual-digital encounter, what I am calling the interface, is 
such an experience of duration, an embodied experience, felt not only 
perceptually but also affectively. In terms that recall my earlier discussion of 
affective excess, Hansen (2004, 12) notes that ‘this function of the body gives 
rise to an affective “supplement” to the act of perceiving the image’, which he 
describes as a ‘properly haptic domain of sensation’. Hansen discusses the slow 
motion video installations of Bill Viola, as well as Douglas Gordon, in terms of 
their ‘affective “supplement”’, as an embodied experience of time, whose 
duration is the condition for the emergence of the new. 
These installations bring us, Hansen (2004, 12) suggests, ‘face-to-face with the 
temporal (affective) dynamics underlying the emergence of the present.’ Such 
work ‘can thus be said to enlarge the now precisely by putting perception into 
the service of affection, or in other words, by opening perception to the very 
principle of its own self-perpetuation, to its own radical imperceptible - 
affectivity’ (Hansen 2004, 267). For Hansen (2004, 266), this affectivity of the 
expanded now, its felt duration, is the ‘capacity for the body to be radically 
creative, that is, to be the agent of a framing of digital information that 
generates images independently of all preexistent technical frames.’
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My work in medium specific (discussed in Section 5.3.1), using photomontage to 
explore the folds of the interface, and in this way disrupt and delay the anxious 
tempo of the circulation-image, making room for the emergence of the new, is 
clearly informed by Hansen’s use of Bergsonist duration to theorise the 
creative potential of the digital image. But a closer look at Bergson’s notion of 
duration suggests that this potential can only be fully realised as a politics of 
resistance to the image-machine of control when, to quote Massumi (1995, 
105) again in terms that recall the earlier discussion of the fluid dynamics of 
the interface, ‘the edge of virtual, where it leaks into actual’ is identified. For 
‘that seeping edge is where potential, actually, is found’, as Massumi (1995, 
105) makes clear. To find this seeping edge, I suggest below, we must work in 
the interface, not as pure duration, but as vibration.
Duration, in Bergson’s account, is the separation of time ‘from its conceptual 
dependence on being represented in spatial terms’; it is ‘pure qualitative 
differentiation, without quantitative measure’ (Osborne 2013, 187). ‘A moving 
continuity is given to us, in which everything changes and yet remains’ 
Bergson (2004, 260) insists, and through this lived presentness of duration we 
come to sense that we live ‘in that continuity of becoming which is reality itself’ 
(Bergson 2004, 178). Reality is virtual, a continuity of becoming. As Osborne 
(2013, 187) explains, ‘duration became the metaphysically real sphere of 
“virtuality”, from which (spatial) actuality is incessantly produced as a world 
of discrete beings and relations by the creative and transformative process of 
life itself’. The virtual reality of duration is ‘the pressing crowd of incipiencies 
and tendencies, […] a realm of potential’ (Massumi 1995, 91). It is this virtual 
mode of reality that I have sought in the duration of the interface as a zone of 
indetermination, ‘the reality of change: the event’ (Massumi 1998, 16).
But what might the ‘seeping edge’ of the interface look and feel like, where the 
virtual can leak into the actual? As Osborne suggests, seeing the interface in 
this way requires a recognition of the dependence of continuity of becoming on 
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the discontinuity of being, for time as pure duration is only ever virtual, never 
in being. Osborne reaffirms Bachelard’s emphasis on psychic continuity as 
being composed of living from moment to moment. ‘[W]hat has most duration 
is what is best at starting itself up all over again’, insisted Bachelard (2000, 
19-20, cited by Osborne 2013, 188). In doing so, Osborne (2013, 188) stresses 
that duration ‘is a dialectical process of continuity, interruption, and beginning 
again - always beginning again. The fundamental concept of time is thus not 
continuity (as Bergson thought), but temporalization as rhythm.’
The interface, then, has rhythmic potential, but Goodman (2012, 88) 
complicates this further. His discussion of Bachelard’s work on rhythm 
analysis notes that Bachelard’s reliance on a dialectics ‘to reanimate a 
continuity broken by instants seems to reduce the power of his philosophy of 
rhythm, relying as it does on polarization over more sophisticated conceptions 
of relation.’ Instead, the challenge is to focus on the relation between duration 
and the instant, continuity and discontinuity, ‘to account for the rhythmic 
vibration between break and flow, between particle and wave, which 
postquantum formulations of matter insist on’ (Goodman 2012, 89).
Drawing on the atomistic process philosophy of Whitehead, which it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to thoroughly discuss, Goodman (2012, 82) insists that, 
‘it is a concern for potential vibration and the abstract rhythmic relation of 
oscillation, which is key. What is prioritized here is the in-between of 
oscillation, the vibration of vibration, the virtuality of the tremble.’ To 
understand the relation between duration and instant, flow and cut, we must 
attend to the ‘vibratory nexus’ which ‘exceeds and precedes the distinction 
between subject and object, constituting a mesh of relation in which discreet 
entities prehend each other’s vibrations’ (Goodman 2012, 82).
This nexus, or ‘vibrational anarchitecture’, ‘produces the very division between 
subjective and objective, time and space’ (Goodman 2012, 82). Goodman’s 
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fascinating elaboration of this ontology of vibrational force, premised on the 
basic understanding that at ‘the molecular or quantum level, everything is in 
motion, is vibrating’ returns us to the fluid turbulence of the organic-machinic 
interface of digital visuality. In Hookway’s (2014, 64) formulation, the 
interface:
exists only in the dynamics of a continual formation, dissolution, and 
reformation. Within a dynamic form, the interface is not a form so much as 
a tendency toward a forming, which proceeds through a seeking of 
difference and its counterpoise in equilibrium.
The dynamics of the interface express the ‘vibratory nexus’ described by 
Goodman, exceeding and preceding visual subject and object, an ‘in-between 
of oscillation’ whose liberatory potential may be felt in its ‘virtuality of the 
tremble.’ In exploring this trembling at the interface, we may come to see the 
vibrational potential to unsettle and contest the flows and arrests of the 
circulation-image of control. 
This chapter began with the acknowledgement that the image-machine of 
control is always experienced more intensely by those subjected to the mastery 
of other people’s vision. Theorising of our posthumanist condition has explored 
the political possibilities opened up by a decentering of the humanist subject, 
implicitly or explicitly white, Western and male, and I locate these possibilities 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of the faciality system, and the ‘lines of 
flight’ they chart from its binary machine of self/other distinctions. Escape 
from the faciality system depends on seeing the digital-visual interface not in 
terms of a face-to-face encounter, which risks re-instantiating that very system, 
but as a threshold condition of becoming. Theorising the interface in terms of 
its fluid dynamics and vibrational ontology opens up its potential to disrupt the 
rhythms of the circulation-image of control, which may, to quote Massumi 
(1995, 105) again, ‘enable triggerings of change.’ My creative practice has 
been concerned with getting in touch with this ‘trembling’ interface, and what 
this might do to trigger a sense of resistance to the image-machine of control. It 
is to discussion of such work that I now turn. 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5. Trembling at the Interface
5.1 Background to creative practice
In approaching the interface as a site-moment of critical engagement with the 
visual operations of social control, I have drawn on my experiences of, as well 
as frustrations with, photographic and video work rooted in documentary form 
and politically declarative intent. Much of my photography prior to the 
creative practice to be discussed in this chapter was concerned with the 
documentation of street protests. This was politically intentional street 
photography: images of protest as protest. As such, there is a performative 
quality to my street protest photography, most explicitly in the images I took of 
protest signs. These images become another iteration of the signs, continuing 
the struggle visually beyond the time and the place of the protest itself. 
My visual activism, then, took the form of using visual means to continue to 
activate the political protest, helping to sustain the energy of the struggle, in 
part through rapid online dissemination of images widely on social media and 
image-sharing sites. In the speed and scale of image-sharing made possible by 
digital data infrastructures, as discussed in Chapter Two, my photography 
became a way to extend the duration of the street protest, to afford it an 
afterlife. I also made deliberate use of saturated colour, as a formal technique 
to both vivify the image-protest and lay stress on my relationship to it as one of 
(visual) participation rather than documentary observation. 
Occupy Wall Street (OWS), whose onset coincided with the beginning of my 
PhD, was paradoxically generative, generating opportunities for a practice of 
street protest photography while provoking a reconsideration of the links 
between image-making and political struggle. With its embrace of the politico-
aesthetics of the Situationist détournement, which takes the image as a site of 
struggle and not merely its representation, OWS led me to think differently 
about visual activism (McKee 2016). 
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Occupy drew heavily and self-consciously on the Situationist commitment to 
‘take back from the enemy those properties that the enemy has transformed 
into weapons against the dispossessed’ (Rancière 2013, 130). Such action, in 
the domain of visuality, was concerned with countering the alienation 
produced by representation itself. As the 2013 reissue of Debord’s (2013) 
Society of the Spectacle attests, his Marxist critique of the political passivity 
induced by televisual production and consumption of image-commodities is 
resonating anew with activists today, confronting the imagistic inundation 
described in Chapter Two. In this view, visual activism becomes a reclaiming 
of political agency that the image-as-spectacle undermines. In Rancière's 
(2013, 130) formulation, the ‘essence of détournement is the Feuerbachian and 
Marxist transformation of the alienated predicate into subjective possession; it 
is the direct re-appropriation of what has been put at a remove in 
representation.’
In the following section, I discuss the ways in which my visual practice too 
moved away from a concern with representation and towards an investigation 
of the liberatory potential of abstraction, and subsequently an interest in 
circulation. For my theorisation of the image-machine of control suggested that 
a visual practice committed to contesting the scopic operations of social control 
must focus, not on the spectacle of image saturation in whose commodity 
status the viewer is alienated and pacified, but on the activation of data flows 
which the images on our screens, as circulation-image, incite.
This interest in the rhythms of flow and stasis, movement and capture, that 
characterise the operations of the circulation-image, and the digital-visual 
interface as a site-moment of indeterminism in which to sense the potential of 
other rhythms beyond control, also led me to think in different ways about the 
use of the moving image. Prior to beginning my doctoral work, I had shot two 
video documentaries and created one ‘digital story’, a short video format which 
typically pairs an autobiographical voiceover with photos from the narrator's 
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life. All of this creative work was conducted as part of my involvement in 
social justice struggles, ranging from work on challenging male supremacy to 
my activism on ending child sexual abuse. 
This video work was straightforward in its messaging and conventional in 
form, being narratively driven and character based. I used video to tell stories 
of injustice and of efforts to challenge this injustice. One of my motivations, 
however, for beginning the PhD in Creative and Critical Practice at the 
University of Sussex was my growing interest in finding different ways to use 
the medium of digital video to explore the issues of injustice with which I was 
concerned. In particular, I could see the limits of my current approach to video 
documentary as an exposure of injustice. As Lütticken (2013, 293) writes, 
‘[g]estures of “revealing” the hidden truth of capitalism are not in themselves 
enough; what is needed is the mapping of concrete abstraction and its 
contradictions as being open to intervention, and as necessitating change.’ The 
possibilities of using video, together with photography, to look at the ‘concrete 
abstraction’ of the image-machine and the liberatory potential of its digital-
visual interfaces excited me. My exploration of these possibilities began with 
my turn to visual abstraction itself.
5.2 Overview of creative process
5.2.1 Towards abstraction
My creative practice responded to the two questions animating my PhD work: 
how does ubiquitous computation affect the visual operations of contemporary 
social control and what does this mean for the use of visual media in resisting 
such control? To answer these questions, my visual practice came to focus on 
circulation rather than representation as the locus of resistance. The digital 
image, as Chapter Two discussed, provides an unstable ground for counter-
representations and visual subjectivities, existing as it does as a movement and 
patterning of light-data, and subject to continuous modulation and deformation 
in the topology of informational time-space. 
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Digital visuality, as analog video before it, is encoded light. Lazzarato’s  (2002) 
discussion of video images, in Lütticken’s (2013, 122) phrasing, as ‘no 
representations or reproductions of reality, but oscillations of light, 
contractions and expansions of light waves’, speaks well to the ontology of the 
digital image as unsettled flux not stable form. It is with the management and 
modulation of this imagistic flux, rather than with representation itself, that 
visual resistance to scopic control must be concerned. As Crary (2013, 48) 
suggests, to do otherwise:
is to evade the subordination of the image to a broad field of non-visual 
operations and requirements. Most images are now produced and circulated 
in the service of maximising the amount of time spent in habitual forms of 
individual self-management and self-regulation.
I came to theorise the infrastructure that modulates these data circulations and 
patternings of digital visuality in the service of both State and corporate 
interests as the ‘image-machine of control’. This in turn provoked an interest in 
the potential sites and sights of resistance to be found in the ‘fluid’ dynamics of 
the interface, which names the volatile thresholds produced by visual 
encounters with the circulatory flows of digitally screened images. But to get 
there, I first had to move away from a concern with representation and instead 
use visual abstraction to begin to unsettle the circulation-image of control.
In this move towards abstraction I was inspired by the long history of 
‘photographs that refuse to disclose fully the images they contain’ (Rexer 2009, 
9). Rexer’s (2009) review of abstraction in photography influenced my 
practice, with his emphasis on the visually abstract image as sensuous surface 
demanding the viewer’s presence, rather than mirrors of, or windows on to, an 
elsewhere, another time. Indeed, much of my photographic work has been an 
inquiry into images of/as surfaces, seeking out the refractive mediums of glass 
and perspex through which to bend light (in my work medium specific) and 
using, often extreme, close-ups of walls and other urban surfaces in order to 
touch the image with the eye (as in surface gaze, figure ground and touch light). 
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This focus on the surface of/as the image was guided by Rexer’s (2009, 180) 
insight that:
The guarantee of a photograph is not its image, its representation, so easily 
conflated with its subject; it is its surface, its utter two-dimensionality, a 
kind of limiting condition containing the promise of whatever it is we get 
from a photograph, of a photographic experience.
This commitment to the presentness of the photographic experience to be 
proffered by visual abstraction has, in the past, been expressed by attention to 
the materiality of analog photography, such as Moholy-Nagy’s (1947) 
pioneering photograms, whose images of objects were produced by directly 
exposing the object to light sensitive paper. Beshty (Cartwright 2014), 
Broomberg and Chanarin (Colberg 2013), and Tillman (Higgins 2014) among 
others have, in recent times, similarly used the materiality of the photographic 
process and visual abstraction to interrogate the limits of representation. 
In all this work, the sense that the ‘abstract photograph signifies not the given 
but the possible’ (Rexer 2009, 180) was what interested me: visual abstraction 
as a way into seeing and feeling an ‘outside’ of control. This is the sense of the 
abstract invoked by Deleuze, as characterised by Massumi (2002, 5) thus:
Here, abstract means: never present in position, only ever in passing. This is 
an abstractness pertaining to the transitional immediacy of a real relation - 
that of a body to its own indeterminacy (its openness to an elsewhere and 
otherwise than it is, in any here and now).
In my photography ‘at the edge of vision’, I sought this indeterminacy in terms 
of both the visual content of the images I made and the process by which I 
made them. 
My photographic work was undertaken in the streets of Brooklyn and 
Manhattan, but this was a very different street photography to that which I 
had been exposed when I first moved to the city. Not only absent people, my 
work used acute angles of view, shallow depth of field, tight framing and 
cropping as well as macro lens proximity to help ‘transform a pedestrian reality 
into something completely unknown’ (Rexer 2009, 143).  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My practice also sought the contingent in the pedestrian, gathering images of 
urban surfaces, textures, reflections and refractions as I walked the streets in a 
kind of photographic wandering akin to the situationist dérive (Plant 1992; 
Yoon 2013), whose wilful traversing of capitalism’s enclosures of urban space-
time provoked an ‘openness to an elsewhere and otherwise’. Seeking an 
openness to that which is not already given visually, I became interested in the 
virtuality of photography, a virtuality understood, in Massumi’s (2002, 175) 
phrasing, as ‘like a halo of eventness fuzzifying solidity of form and thus 
confounding closure’, an ‘“aura” of newness surrounding and suffusing what 
actually emerges.’ 
This virtuality of visual abstraction is nothing to do with the digital per se, as 
the analog examples of Moholy-Nagy’s photograms and Tillman’s 
contemporary luminograms make clear. Indeed, Massumi (2002, 137) 
emphasises that:
Nothing is more destructive for the thinking and imaging of the virtual than 
equating it with the digital. [...] Digital technologies in fact have a 
remarkably weak connection to the virtual, by virtue of the enormous power 
of their systematization of the possible.
Given this, the need to make sense of the dis/continuities between the analog 
and the digital, whose significance for my critical analysis and creative practice 
I discussed in Chapter Two, became central in my turn to the virtuality of 
visual abstraction as a way to contest the scopic operations of control. If visual 
abstraction is to be in touch with reality’s ‘own indeterminacy’, this abstraction 
in the digital era must confront its own ‘systematisation of the possible.’
This is to say that when it comes to the digital image, a practice that seeks to 
explore the virtuality of visual abstraction is confronted by the actuality of data 
abstraction. In the computational conditions of the image-machine of control, a 
recourse to visual abstraction as the sense of an ‘outside’ must reckon with the 
operations of control enabled by the data abstraction that is digital visuality. 
Control operates through the deterritorialising effects of the infosphere’s data 
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flows; its terrain is the very outside that would claim to lie beyond it. As 
Lazzarato (2006, 175) suggests, in the control society, ‘that which is confined is 
the outside. What is confined is the virtual, the power of metamorphosis, 
becoming.’ Massumi (2002, 88) similarly defines control in terms of this 
containment of the virtual:
The power of control is decoding and deterritorialization, delivered (ready 
for catalysis, into a potentialization-and-containment in a new space; ready 
for recoding/recodification and reterritorialization). Control is modulation 
made a power factor (its flow factor). [...] The ultimate capture, not of the 
elements of expression, not even of expression, but of the movement of the 
event itself.
For my practice, then, the turn away from representation and towards 
abstraction as a way to visually express and experience the sense of an 
‘outside’ was soon problematised by my theorising of the image-machine of 
control as a confinement of the virtual through its abstraction of light into data. 
I came to see that a liberatory visual practice must look beyond abstraction 
itself and consider the movements and captures of data that constitute the 
operations of the image-machine: from experiments with abstraction to 
enquiries into circulation.
These enquiries came to centre on the interface produced by the visual 
encounter with the digital screen, as a site-moment of contingency engendered 
by the ‘fluid’ dynamics of the image-machine’s data flows. I became curious 
about the rhythms of circulation and arrest, flow and stasis, that constitute 
these dynamics, and how I might unsettle these rhythms in order to trouble the 
modulations performed by the circulation-image of control. The circulation-
image, as I discussed in Chapter Three, works through affective capture, 
inciting an interactivity with the screen in response to the anxieties wrought by 
ubiquitous computation, whose dematerialisation of the real appears to be 
instantiated in digital imagery. We are constantly reminded that the images on 
our screens are an unstable flux not settled form, from compression artefacts to 
loading delays to mashable potential.  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The digital image embodies and enacts ‘the cultural perception that material 
objects are interpenetrated by information patterns’ (Hayles 1999, 13-14). This 
complicates the turn to materiality as a strategy for exposing the limits of 
representation and exploring processes of mediation, as referred to earlier in 
the work of Tillman, Beshty and others. Pervasive digital infrastructures are 
im/material systems. The Internet of Things renders the physical environment 
an informational meshwork, ‘weightless as sunshine’ (Hayles 1999, 56). Cloud 
computing, as Franklin (2012a, 450) notes, emblematises an environment of 
total computation, whose defining quality ‘is its nominal immateriality and 
amorphousness.’ Yet, as he (Franklin 2012a, 458) continues, the cloud is ‘a 
space where the material boundaries of hardware disappear while retaining the 
functions of capture, discretization, and valorization that suggest the opposite 
of amorphousness.’ The computational infrastructures and logics operating the 
image-machine of control are an admixture of ‘transcendent ethereality and 
complex materiality’ (Franklin 2012a, 452). 
Under these conditions, Virno (2008, 41) proposes that ‘the fundamental 
problem is not to oppose the abstraction of social life in the name of a 
supposedly “concrete”, but to derive a totally new “concrete” precisely from 
the reality of abstraction.’ As already noted, Trevor Paglen’s (Squibb 2013) 
ethereal images of the ‘complex materiality’ of drone warfare and internet 
surveillance infrastructures are one response to Virno’s challenge. Clement 
Valla’s (2012) exposure of the ‘edge condition’ of visual anomalies, when the 
multiple data inputs from aerial photographs and 3D modelling used by 
Google Earth misalign, is another.
The work of Paglen and Valla influenced my practice. Paglen’s imagery, whose 
ambiguity of indexicality captures the evanescence of power increasingly 
exercised by the US military-surveillance complex, affirmed the possibility of a 
politico-aesthetics adequate to the im/material realities which it confronted. 
Valla’s work spoke more directly to my concerns with the image-machine of 
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control. His refusal of the alluring consolations of glitch aesthetics informed 
my own attention to edge conditions, which I came to theorise in terms of the 
interface as a dynamic boundary condition. As he (Valla 2012) writes:
At first, I thought they were glitches, or errors in the algorithm, but looking 
closer, I realized the situation was actually more interesting — these images 
are not glitches. They are the absolute logical result of the system. They are 
an edge condition—an anomaly within the system, a nonstandard, an 
outlier, even, but not an error. 
The specifics of Google Earth’s perceptual anomalies, generated by its use of 
texture mapping software, which stretch 2D photographs over the surface of 
3D models, were of less direct interest to me than the distinction Valla (2012) 
drew between two ways of seeing: ‘we see through a photograph, we look at a 
texture’. For the threshold between these two visual modes is the digital-visual 
interface, a visual encounter with the screen whose surface begs to be touched, 
to recall Galloway’s (2012) suggestive phrasing. Visual information, that ‘kind 
of immaterial fluid that circulates effortlessly around the globe’ (Hayles 1999, 
246), is instantiated as imagery on the texture of the screen, and my practice 
evolved as an exploration of the liberatory potential of this interface, as a 
boundary condition of im/materiality.
5.2.2 Thresholds between stillness and movement
The digital-visual interface is im/material, a threshold of dematerialised data 
flows materialising as images on the smudged surface of a glowing screen, 
images of a world increasingly dematerialised by the abstractions of data 
algorithms in the service of the very material realities of social control and 
corporate profit. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the result of this 
‘transcendent ethereality and complex materiality’ of the contemporary image-
machine, to quote Franklin (2012a, 452) again, is an affective ambience of 
anxiety. The interface is unsettling. 
If the circulation-image of control operates as response to this anxious affect of 
the interface, the politico-aesthetics of my creative practice have centred on 
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staying with and in the trouble of the interface, through attention to its 
rhythms. Recognising the limitations of both visual abstraction and material 
visual practice as strategies to counter the operations of the image-machine of 
control, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, I came to focus on 
disrupting the image-machine through disturbing its rhythms of fluidity and 
stasis, circulation and capture, flow and arrest. In Massumi's (2002, 217) view:
The true duality is between continuity and discontinuity […]. This is not a 
metaphysical opposition. It is a processual rhythm, in and of the world, 
expressing an ontological tension between manipulable objectivity and 
elusively ongoing qualitative activity (becoming).
Control is the containment of becoming, the confinement of an outside, and 
thus the management of rhythm. In Chapter Four, I discussed Bergson’s 
notions of duration and the virtual and their influence on Deleuze’s 
formulation of control and its outside. The virtuality of the visual, its liberatory 
potential, may be expressed, I suggested, in the duration of the interface. With 
reference to Bachelard and Whitehead on relations between the continuity (of 
duration) and discontinuity (of the instant), I agreed with Goodman (2012, 
82) in concluding that, rather than duration per se, ‘it is a concern for potential 
vibration and the abstract rhythmic relation of oscillation, which is key.’ For 
the virtual to become actual, it is to ‘the virtuality of the tremble’ we must look.
With these issues of rhythm and vibration to the fore, my visual practice 
evolved as an enquiry into the interface as a relation between continuity and 
discontinuity, a threshold between stillness and movement. To pursue this 
enquiry I used photography and video, technologies of the still and moving 
image respectively. As already noted, my use of these older technologies of new 
digital visual media was, in part, motivated by the recognition that, to quote 
Munster (2006, 164) again, ‘the place where electronic art and the postcolonial 
impulse have met lies with forms such as digital photomedia and video’. The 
use of these digital art practices can ‘undermine, parody and forcibly 
differentiate the smooth flows of global speed along a meridian of new vectors 
and [keep] them open to contestation’ (Munster 2006, 171). 
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My early thinking, then, on the choice of photography and video for my digital 
art practice centred on how such ‘critically reflexive practices of 
technologically outmoded new media art’ (Munster 2006, 164) could be 
deployed in the metropolitan centre of global capitalism, New York City, to 
play with and contest the ‘smooth flows of global speed’, disrupting their 
tempo and inciting turbulence. Subsequent theorising of the image-machine of 
control, in conjunction with my interest in the ‘everyday’ as a generative time-
space of resistance, also reinforced my interest in using the most quotidian 
forms of image-making (video and photography) and platforms of image-
sharing (a Tumblr blog) as tools for troubling the smooth flows and 
functioning of the image-machine. 
In this respect, Lefebvre’s (2004) conception and practice of ‘rhythmanalysis’ 
as a way to understand capitalism’s regulation of ‘space, time and everyday 
life’, and thus glimpse the possibilities of counter-rhythms of resistance to such 
regulation, was influential. For I came to see not only that the interface was a 
time-space of encounter with the rhythms of capitalism’s image-machine, but 
also the uses I could make of photography and video, as visual technologies of 
stillness and movement, to explore the vibrational potential of the interface.
The visual strategies I developed for this exploration, and the photographic 
and video work I created as a result, are discussed below. In Section 5.3, I 
present my photographic work, and its use of photomontage to be in the folds 
of the digital-visual interface (in medium specific), as well as haptic imagery to 
get in touch with a sense of its virtuality (in surface gaze, figure ground, and touch 
light). Section 5.4 discusses my experiments with video as a way to express and 
experience the vibrations of/at the interface, through setting up interference 
patterns (in look screen) and sonic and visual counter-rhythms (in moving still). 
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5.2.3 Unsettling sound
Sound, and an appeal to the sonic, has often been used to challenge the 
‘sovereign’ sense of sight, and the anthropocentric mastery, in practice white, 
male, European and ruling class, that this ocularcentrism was taken to imply 
(Bryson 1988; Jay 1988; Jay 2006). In what Sterne (2012, 9) characterises as 
the ‘audiovisual litany’, the sense of hearing is often configured, in both 
academic and popular discourse, as a challenge to the mastery of sight; where 
sight is distanced and perspectival, hearing is close and immersive. Davis 
(2000) proposes that ‘[a]coustic spaces can create different subjectivities; they 
open possibilities and potentials, particularly on aesthetic and informational 
levels, that can help us feel our way through the spaces we are opening up and 
moving into.’ For this reason, such spaces are ‘much, much, stronger than a 
visual experience, which tacitly distances you, places you in a transcendent, 
removed position, rather than embodying you at the center of a new context.’
This understanding of sound as an opening of potential, helping ‘us feel our 
way through the spaces we are opening up’, resonated with my interest in 
exploring the ‘virtuality of the tremble’ in the time-space of the interface. As 
my practice evolved toward a concern with the data circulations of the image-
machine of control, and with the interface as a site-moment for experiments 
with counter-rhythms of movement and stillness whose vibrations might 
resonate with a sense of potential, an outside of control, I grew increasingly 
interested in the ways in which I could conjoin and disjoin images and sound 
to generate such counter-rhythms.
Exploring this virtual quality of the sonic became an important part of my 
visual practice. In part this reflected a commitment to de-throning the visual 
by emphasising the sensorial impurity of both sight and images. Mitchell 
(2008, 16) insists that ‘all the so-called “visual media” are mixed or hybrid 
formations, combining sound and sight, text and image’, while Pink (2011, 4) 
invites us ‘to acknowledge the multisensoriality of images’.  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That the digital has militated against this acknowledgement by virtue of the 
‘degree to which our habitual focus on the visual may bind us to the screen’ 
leads Bassett (2013, 151) to argue that a ‘sonic perspective (even if a 
virtualized one) provides a fresh way to audit social media operations.’ In 
similar vein, Goodman (2012, 22) refers to Davis’ (2000) theorising of an 
‘acoustic cyberspace’, which is ‘essentially invasive, resonant, vibratory, and 
immersive’, as a challenge to the prevailing models of ‘virtual reality’ premised 
on a Cartesian I/eye of disembodied subjectivity through perspectival mastery.
My interest in the anxious affect of the circulation-image also prompted an 
interest in the acoustic experience of the digital-visual interface, for, as Davis 
(2000) makes clear, ‘[m]usic and sound are tremendously powerful forces for 
organizing affect’. I saw the value of playing with the vibrational potential of 
the sonic, its intimate capacity to unsettle bodily rhythms in ways that the 
more distanced sense of sight cannot. But if it was clear that sound should be 
of interest to any project seeking to challenge the visual operations of control, 
it was also important to avoid a simplistic distinction between visual mastery 
and sonic subversion. Sterne (2012) cautions that naive contrasts between the 
sonic and the visual risk reaffirming rather than challenging the othering of the 
auditory as non-Western and ‘primitive’ in relation to the privileging of vision 
as defining of Western modernity. 
More concretely, Goodman’s (2012) account of ‘sonic warfare’ details the 
many ways in which the sonic is deployed as a technology of domination and 
control. This ranges from the use of holosonic weapons in crowd control to the 
role of Muzak in the ambient modulation of public space. Indeed, Goodman 
(2012, 144) suggests that the shift from Muzak’s use of stimulus progression as 
a form of sonic discipline to the ‘horizontality of background, atmospheric 
control in quantum modulation that no longer needs to correct individual 
action directly’ provides ‘a sonic microcosm of what Deleuze described as the 
shift from disciplinary societies to societies of control.’
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As sound has emerged in my work, then, it has done so ambiguously. On the 
one hand, sound as Goodman (2012, 65) suggests ‘is often understood as 
generally having a privileged role in the production and modulation of fear, 
activating instinctive responses, triggering an evolutionary functional 
nervousness.’ The affective anxieties produced by and helping to reproduce 
the image-machine of control has always had a sonic dimension; the ‘sonic is 
particularly attuned to examining one strand of this ecology of fear: 
dread’ (Goodman 2012, 12).
On the other hand, sound, and in particular noise, has long been hailed for its 
excessive properties as well as generative potential: ‘noise as rhythmic 
reservoir’ (Goodman 2012, 107). Knowing that ‘noise arises everywhere 
information is produced’ (Mowitt 2012, 221), the minimisation of noise, as 
already noted, was a primary concern of Shannon and Weaver’s (1963) work 
on information theory as the basis for efficient communication, so influential in 
the control paradigm delineated by Deleuze. In this sense, noise militates 
against the logic of control. As Clarke (2010, 164) suggests, ‘the productive 
ambiguity of noise emerged from the consideration that it too is information - 
and precisely unexpected information, an uncanny increment that rolls the dice 
of randomness within every communicative and calculative transmission.’ 
An ‘uncanny increment’, noise is the excluded remainder out of which the new 
can emerge. Noise is a turbulence, generative in ways that the concept of the 
interface in fluid dynamics was developed to account for, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. It is noteworthy that for Serres, whose work on turbulence as 
the source of emergence was so influential on Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis 
on the ‘line of flight’ as that which could escape the striated space of control, 
‘the concept of noise, often stands in for, or is interchangeable with, the notion 
of turbulence from physics’ (Goodman 2012, 105). Interfaces are noisy, out of 
whose vibrations the ‘potentiality of something else’ can emerge.
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This radical politico-aesthetics of noise has long been recognised. Kane (2014) 
recalls the efforts of Dadaism ‘to subvert clear and compressed visuality 
through a series of decompressed, noisy, political acts.’ She (Kane 2014) notes 
that Tristan Tzara, author of the 1918 Dada manifesto, argued that ‘noise, in 
opposition to normative views of sound and music, embraced a logic of 
“complication”’. For experimental musicians such as John Cage, ‘noise became 
the core issue in audiovisual experience’ (Kane 2014, emphasis in original) as a 
means of disrupting the normative conventions of such experience. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy given my earlier discussion of the sense of the virtual 
to be seen in visual abstraction, that in the experimental musical compositions 
of Eric Satie, Edgard Varèse, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and Pierre Boulez 
among others, as Kane (2014) notes, ‘colorful visual abstractions were often 
integrated into their experimental performances, such as the pivotal 
multimedia event engineered for the 1957 World’s Fair in Brussels.’ Linking 
the potential inherent within both informatic and sonic noise to introduce a 
generative turbulence into communicative circuits, Clarke (2010, 164) 
concludes that ‘from the standpoint of art forms instantiated in informatic 
media (aural sounds, visual images, linguistic signs), the noise is the art.’ The 
specific ways in which my video work explored this generative turbulence of 
noise, sonically and visually, is discussed in detail in Section 5.4.
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5.3 Photographic work
5.3.1 In the folds of the interface: medium specific
The informational space-time of computational capitalism is best understood, 
as Chapter Two explained, as a topology of flows and folds. In recalling, from 
Chapter Two, Wark’s (2015, 5) discussion of the ‘third nature’ of informational 
capitalism, which he contrasts with the ‘second nature’ of industrial capitalism, 
he characterises the former as ‘rather more topological’. The data circuits of 
the image-machine of control operate in this topological space of folded flows.
In these conditions, the ground of perspectival representation is unsettled. ‘No 
longer is perspective fixed; instead, relationships, such as representations and 
their prototypes, are dynamic in the expression of conceptual and literal space’, 
notes Bucksbarg (2010, 152), a dynamic that is ‘expressed with the notion of 
“the fold”’. Ertuna (2009, 280) names the implications of this clearly:
In other words, the non-linear, labyrinthine nature of fold defies the ideas of 
a cohesive space and time. But perhaps more importantly, the notion of fold 
also challenges humanist visions of subjectivity where the subject figures as 
a central, unified and cohesive whole.
The ‘fold’, then, has attracted the interest of theorists of new media who want 
to look beyond ‘humanist visions of subjectivity’ and see the potential for 
resistance to, or emergence from, the ‘measures and constraints’ of algorithmic 
control. 
The figure of the fold features prominently in Munster’s work on new media 
and embodiment. She (Munster 2006, 32) writes that the ‘fold will provide us 
with a useful concept for inscribing the creases, doublings and separations that 
characterise the differential relations of bodies and code within information 
aesthetics.’ As do others (Murray 2008), Munster makes extensive use of 
Deleuze’s discussion of the ‘baroque’ as an aesthetics of the fold, in order to 
explore its liberatory potential, given that, in Walton’s (2011, 140) account, 
what defines the ‘baroque [is] its aesthetic dedication to emotion, movement, 
materiality and multiplicity.’
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My photographic work medium specific seeks to play with these baroque 
qualities of movement, materiality and multiplicity within a visual fold. The six 
images I present were taken over the course of my doctoral work, in locations 
in Brooklyn and Manhattan. I experimented with a photographic practice 
using refractive mediums to be found in urban surfaces to cause light to move 
and pleat in ways that are specific to and contingent upon the materiality of 
refraction and the multiplicity of conditions in which the images were taken. 
The glass of windows in buildings and cars, and the perspex used in the 
temporary fencing that surrounds the proliferating building sites that dot many 
gentrifying neighbourhoods, provided the mediums for such refraction. 
An early influence on my work as I began this experimentation was the 
celebrated New York street photography of Lee Friedlander. His images of 
pedestrians and their reflections in the windows of store-fronts and other 
buildings provided a commentary on the fragmented nature of the urban 
landscape. I was less interested, however, in any kind of social realist 
commentary, and more focused on the formal qualities of multiplicity and 
movement that could be expressed in an image by taking photographs through 
reflective/refractive mediums. 
For this reason, one of the criteria guiding my selection of images for inclusion 
in the final work of medium specific was the degree to which the images 
expressed a visual heterogeneity, abstracted from but not ‘of’ the urban 
environment. The images are not situated in any definable way in the specific 
locations in which I took them. They have an abstract quality which draws the 
eye into the image itself, rather than through the image and out toward the 
photographed object. I emphasised this quality of formal abstraction by only 
choosing images which were devoid of people. In this way I also sought to 
direct attention away from the tropes of mirrors and reflections used in the 
theorising of fractured subjectivity, and instead insist on attention to the 
images as an interface with the image-machine and its flows of light-data.
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I think of these images, then, as a live photomontage, whose arrangements of 
light are undetermined by algorithm or photographer. As photomontage, these 
images are a folding of layers of light over each other in baroque 
configurations that both illumine, and may interrupt, the imagistic flow of the 
image-machine of control. In Munster’s (2006, 6) view:
Both baroque and digital spaces engage the viewer visually, seductively and 
affectively. They operate by creating clusters of objects, images, sounds and 
concepts that belong together in variation and dissonance. These clusters 
are not formed through arbitrary associations but emerge as the outcomes of 
differential connections.
The political potential of photomontage as a clustering of variation and 
dissonance has long been recognised. In Rancière’s (2011, 26) account, the 
politics of collage and photomontage inhered in ‘the clash on the same surface 
of heterogeneous, if not conflicting, elements.’ 
For the surrealists, Rancière (2011, 26) notes, photomontage ‘served to 
express the reality of desire and dreams repressed under the prosaic character 
of bourgeois quotidian reality.’ An inspiring example for me of this approach to 
using montage in photography was the work of Alvin Langdon Coburn, whose 
Vortographs, as he termed them, were produced by a camera outfitted with a 
multifaceted prism, enabling him to pioneer the first extended series of 
nonrepresentational photographs, bringing multiple perspectives and temporal 
instances into a single frame (Rexer 2009).
I was also conscious of the politically explicit use of montage by Hanna Höch, 
John Heartfield and Martha Rosler among others.  Marxism, Rancière (2011, 
26) explains, seized on photomontage to ‘render palpable, through the 
incongruous encounter of heterogeneous elements, the violence of the class 
domination concealed beneath the appearances of quotidian ordinariness and 
democratic peace.’ The ways in which montage might be used in photography 
to not only expose but also challenge such hierarchical relations has been 
highlighted by recent writing on the digital manipulation of images. 
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Digital ‘mash-ups’ of appropriated imagery were a significant feature of the 
visual activism of the Occupy movement, with its roots, as already noted, in 
Situationist détournement. Devlin (2012) emphasises that it ‘is important to 
note the denial of a range of hierarchies that these digital photomontages 
embody. There is no distinction made between iconic historical photographs, 
popular film/television shows or artistic ‘masterpieces.’ As a result, Devlin 
(2012) points out, Occupy activists’ use of photomontage:
has had the useful effect of demolishing the authority of the documentary 
image as a statement of fact, and allowing instead for a reconsideration of 
the use of photographic imagery as a catalyst for debate, becoming in the 
process reflexively political.
My work with medium specific is less literal than this, not least because it plays 
with the desire for representational legibility (of self, of world) on which the 
‘affective capture’ of the image-machine of control relies. In its contingent 
folding of light as opposed to purposeful juxtaposing of images, the live 
photomontage of medium specific becomes a time-space of pause and break 
within the imagistic flow. This creates a visual uncertainty, delaying or eluding 
the stimulant action of the circulation-image. McLean (2013, 59) emphasises 
that montage is ‘a sensibility and mode of engagement with the world – one 
seeking to align itself not with explanatory recourse to an established order of 
significations (society, history, context) but with a generative instability’. 
It is this sense of generative instability that the folds of medium specific suggest. 
As Massumi (2002, 134) notes, ‘the virtual is best approached topologically.’ 
The folds of photomontage enfold a sense of potential. Massumi (2002, 1343) 
is clear that:
The appearance of the virtual is in the twists and folds of formed content, in 
the movement from one sample to another. It is in the ins and outs of 
imaging. [...] Since the virtual is in the ins and outs, the only way an image 
can approach it alone is to twist and fold on itself, to multiply itself 
internally.
In medium specific, the images twist and fold on themselves, and in so doing 
multiply potentials. 
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Willerslev and Suhr (2013, 4) characterise this ‘generative instability’ as a 
‘vibrating dissonance’, a trope I return to in the next chapter when discussing 
the vibrational ontology of the digital-visual interface, whose liberatory 
potential I explore in my video works look screen and moving still, presented in 
Chapter Five. As they (Willerslev and Suhr 2013, 4) write:
The “extra thing” that is created through montage can, however, also be 
conceived in terms of a “gap” - that is, as the opening up of a kind of 
incongruence, fuzziness, or vibrating dissonance erupting through the 
confrontation of unlike elements.
But where they figure this dissonance primarily in spatial terms (as a ‘gap’), 
produced by the juxtaposition of ‘unlike elements’, medium specific is also 
interested in dissonant temporalities and how these may interfere with the 
tempo of the circulation-image of control. 
The accelerating speed of capitalism, since Marx’s (1977) celebrated account 
of space being annihilated by time, and the impact of informatisation as a 
motor of further acceleration, has centred theoretical and artistic attention on 
temporality as a ground for critique and intervention (Virilio 1977; Land 2011; 
Noys 2014). Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 500) end their discussion of 
accelerating capitalism with a call to invent ‘new paces’, and it is to digital 
visuality that many have looked as the place for such invention. Hansen’s 
(2004) discussion of the radical potential of new media, to which I return at 
more length in the next chapter in my discussion of the duration of the 
interface, is centred on the disjunctions between machine time and lived time 
that digital media can provoke. 
Crucially, given the forgoing discussion of affective excess, this sense of 
temporal disjunction and its creative potential is affectively experienced, sub-
perceptual. In discussing Bill Viola’s use of extreme slow motion in his video 
works installations, Hansen (2004, 265) notes ‘that consciousness is made to 
live through (affectively, not perceptually) the very process through which it 
continually emerges, from moment to moment, as the selection from a nonlived 
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strictly contemporaneous with it’, and thus sense the capacity to ‘create the 
unpredictable, the experimental, the new’ (Hansen 2004, 8).
The enfolding of body and code in our encounter with the digital image, 
Munster (2006) suggests, also renders the temporal as the locus of the 
political. As she (Munster 2006, 171) notes ‘[i]n all modes of digital media 
production we are witnessing the move from regimes of spatialization to those 
of temporalization’, meaning that ‘the temporal delays characterizing new 
media are a device that disrupts the forces of standardization and 
homogenization in global culture’ (Munster 2006, 22). My work with 
photomontage is similarly committed to such delays and disruption, through a 
folding of light that slows the encounter with the imagistic flow. 
Where the circulation-image of control, fuelled by its affect of anxiety, 
stimulates an incessant tempo of interactivity with the screens of the image-
machine, a tempo under constant pressure to increase (with the unrelenting 
quest for faster data connections), medium specific invites a curiosity and 
contemplation, a slower rhythm of relation to the image. In the folds of the 
photomontage, the data flows of the image-machine are stilled, held in 
suspension, if only briefly, creating a temporal ‘gap’ in which to feel the image 
as more than itself, whose sense of emergence, to quote Massumi (1995, 105) 
again, can ‘enable triggerings of change’. 
I asked in Chapter Two what remains of the digital image for a visual activism 
that would engage with the operations of power under conditions of 
informational capitalism and concluded that we must focus on the circulations, 
patternings and de/formations of data that now constitute the image. In the 
topology of informational space these data flows are inherently unstable, for 
topology, as Massumi (2002, 134) reminds us, is ‘the science of ‘self-varying 
deformation’, concerned with continuous transformation. 
 87
It is to the modulation of such unstable flows that the image-machine of 
control is directed. Modulation operates through affective capture, and 
specifically the anxious affect induced by the processes of dividuation and 
informatised abstraction (discussed in Chapter Two) of computational 
capitalism. The modulatory operations of the image-machine of control work 
through the circulation-image, whose incitements to interactivity with the 
digital screen are fuelled by such affective anxiety. Affectivity, however, is 
always excessive, and in the folds of medium specific I have sought to make room 
for its generative remainder. Within the stillness of these folds of 
photomontage, and the ‘vibrating dissonance’ (Willerslev and Suhr 2013, 4) 
they introduce into the circulations of the image-machine, we may sense the 
digital-visual interface as a time-space of contingency and change.
5.3.2 Touching potential: surface gaze, figure ground, touch light
The term ‘haptic’, used by Deleuze and Guattari to characterise the ‘close 
vision’ associated with smooth, deterritorialised space, was drawn from the art 
historical work of Riegl, who distinguished the haptic engagement with an art 
object from the optical. As Wood (2004, 168) explains: 
Haptic was a neologism of the period derived from the Greek verb haptein, 
meaning “fasten” or “attach.” Haptic referred to a mental fastening or 
attachment to the artifact. It could just as easily be characterized as a 
participatory or empathic relationship to things.
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 493) deployed this distinction in contrasting the 
modes of vision associated with the striated grid of control, which ‘relates to a 
more distant vision, and a more optical space’, with that of the smooth space 
which ‘is both the object of a close vision par excellence and the element of a 
haptic space’. 
In Section 4.4, I reviewed Deleuze and Guattari’s theorising of the creative 
potential for resistance inherent within the turbulence of deterritorialised 
smooth space, as the space of ‘lines of flight’ from capitalism’s control. But they 
were always clear-sighted about the limits of this potential. ‘Never believe that 
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a smooth space will suffice to save us’, they caution in their famous closing line 
to the chapter on The Smooth and The Striated, at the end of A Thousand Plateaus, 
for ‘smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 500).
It was the interplay between smooth and striated, the deterritorialising and 
reterritorialising operations of capitalism, that concerned them. ‘What interests 
us in operations of striation and smoothing are precisely the passages or 
combinations’ Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 500) emphasise, and in the era of 
computational capitalism, it is the digital-visual interface where these passages 
and transitions, the interplay between striation and smoothing, may be most 
clearly felt. Hookway (2014, 93) notes that the ‘interface is the space and 
temporality of translation and reversal’ between the striated and the smooth. 
As he (Hookway 2014, 93) continues, ‘[w]hile as a boundary condition the 
interface is a kind of striation, it is a striation that is also smooth in that it has 
already effaced itself within fluid form.’ 
Haptic vision is a way of looking that keeps us in touch with the smoothness of 
the interface, its volatility and potential for resistance to control. While smooth 
spaces are not inherently liberatory, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 500) insist 
that through being in contact with such spaces ‘the struggle is changed or 
displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, 
invents new paces, switches adversaries.’ In the smooth space of the interface 
we may feel the potential for the emergence of the new. As a sense of close 
looking, the haptic is exploratory, open to what may be felt with the eyes; with 
the haptic, the digital-visual interface remains an opening. Haptic vision gets 
us close and puts us in touch, in ‘empathic relationship to things’. In Massumi’s 
(2002, 158) view, this ‘purely visual touch is a synesthesia proper to vision: a 
touch as only the eyes can touch.’ As Marks (2004, 79) affirms, ‘I prefer to 
describe haptic visuality as a kind of seeing that uses the eye like an organ of 
touch.’ 
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I see my use of photographic close-ups in surface gaze, figure ground and touch 
light as haptic in this way, seeking to get in touch with the interface as a 
smooth space. My turn to the haptic was, in part, influenced by Graham 
Harwood’s Uncomfortable Proximity, a website on its collection of paintings by 
Turner, Wheatley, Gainsborough, Hogarth, Rossetti, Reynolds, Holman Hunt 
and others commissioned by Tate Britain. Harwood’s digital collage, in which 
sections from these paintings are combined with other pictures from the faces 
and flesh of Harwood, his friends and family, draws on some of the same 
impulses that motivated my work with medium specific. But I was especially 
interested in his use of extreme close-up. As Fuller (2000) writes of 
Uncomfortable Proximity, the ‘digital camera allows a proximity to material, to 
skin, to the surface of paint that exceeds the eye’s trained ability to sort and 
recognise.’
The close seeing of haptic vision is ambivalent, inviting both an ‘empathic 
relationship to things’ and the discomfort of disordered visual legibility. My 
early experiments with haptic imagery, in surface gaze, sought to play with this 
ambivalence, by deploying it to disrupt the subject-object relations of the gaze. 
In surface gaze, I face the gaze of the faciality function and attend to its torn and 
marked surfaces as an invitation to get close to the image, whose tight framing 
at the same disrupts the face-to-face encounter. As a ‘between faces’ that is also 
a ‘facing between’, the interface is a liminal time-space, and with surface gaze I 
explore this liminality, moving between the lure of the eyes, and the cuts and 
blotches on the image’s skin, and the loss of the face, in the middle, as it were, 
of a looking that is restless.
My photographic use of haptic visuality evolved over the course of my 
doctorate, coming to focus on the interface itself, and its rhythms of movement 
and stillness. I became interested in exploring ways of using haptic imagery as 
an invitation to pause in the contingency of the interface by getting in touch 
with the folds of its flows. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 493) suggest that 
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‘haptic, smooth space of close vision […] operates step by step’ and with the 
extreme close-ups of figure ground, I invite the eye to wander ‘step by step’ over 
the surface of the image, feeling its way into the image. Smooth space is above 
all nomadic in Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation. It is this visual wandering 
that figure ground invites. 
The images comprising figure ground are the distillation of my photographic 
exploration of urban surfaces around where I live in Brooklyn. I took many 
photos, close up, of walls in my neighbourhood, using a macro lens and acute 
angles of view to create images that particularly played with the ‘eye’s trained 
ability to sort and recognise.’ The images chosen for inclusion in the photoset 
figure ground were selected on the basis of their aesthetic vibrancy, of colour 
and texture, which draws the eye into and then across the image surface. 
These close-up images also play with the figure-ground distinction, so central 
to perspectival representation, and with the loss of this distinction within the 
topological flows of informational space, discussed in Chapter One. In figure 
ground, the two terms constitute and confront each other in a zone of 
indetermination: which is the figure, and which the ground? As both ground 
and figure, and neither at the same time, the cracks and blotches of the wall 
disorient our looking. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 494) emphasise that:
Where there is close vision, space is not visual, or rather the eye itself has a 
haptic, nonoptical function: […] there is neither horizon nor background 
nor perspective nor limit nor outline or form nor center; there is no 
intermediary distance, or all distance is intermediary.
We lose perspective in figure ground, with neither ‘outline or form nor center’ to 
orient us. But in this smooth space of the image a deterritorialised looking 
becomes possible, open to new connections and directions.
My photographic practice, especially with touch light, also invokes the curiosity 
of haptic looking; the three images taken were the result not of composition 
through the viewfinder, but of pressing the camera up against a wall, macro 
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lens pointing up toward the sky but set to its shortest focus distance, and 
seeing what I would find. This aleatory approach to haptic image-making took 
inspiration, in part, from Silvio Wolf’s photographic light abstractions in his 
Chance series, whose stacks and bands of colour, hue and saturation evoke the 
paintings of Rothko and Newman. In Rexer’s (2009, 192) description, ‘Wolf’s 
images occurred at the surface. They expended themselves there, involving the 
viewer in complex, even disorienting optical experiences.’ In this way, Rexer’s 
(2009, 192) writes, these images ‘suggest not so much a stripping away as an 
embrace of all possibilities, as if the totality of what can be shown and seen 
might be contained in a single image.’
I was similarly interested in bringing the eye to the surface of the image to see 
what might occur there. ’Haptic visuality sees the world as though it were 
touching it: close, unknowable, appearing to exist on the surface of the image’ 
Marks (2004, 80) makes clear. And in her description of haptic seeing as a 
meeting and mingling of surfaces, Marks (2004, 80) echoes the conception of 
the interface as a dynamic boundary condition discussed earlier:
In haptic seeing, all our self rushes up to the surface to interact with 
another surface. When this happens there is a concomitant loss of depth – 
we become amoebalike, lacking a center, changing as the surface to which 
we cling changes. We cannot help but be changed in the process of 
interacting.
As a dynamic threshold, the interface is a time-space of indeterminacy, and 
haptic imagery holds us there, present to its potential. Rexer (2009, 192) 
emphasises that haptic images ‘hold us at the surface, never allowing a deeper 
gaze, keeping the eye present and the mind, especially, engaged and aware.’ 
This presentness is an immersion, which is the characteristic of smooth space 
and, in a different register, the quality of lived being in time, in whose sense of 
duration, for Bergson (2004), lay the creative potential of life. In Section 4.5, I 
discussed Hansen’s use of Bergson to explore the liberatory potential of the 
digital image, and specifically the ways in which digitisation has returned the 
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image to an embodied, affective experience, in whose temporality is the 
potential to feel the duration of an ‘enlarged now’.  To quote Hansen (2004, 
266) again, this affectivity of the expanded now, its felt duration, is the 
‘capacity for the body to be radically creative, that is, to be the agent of a 
framing of digital information that generates images independently of all 
preexistent technical frames.’ Crucially, this embodied experience is an 
‘affective “supplement” to the act of perceiving the image’, which Hansen 
(2004, 12) characterises as a ‘properly haptic domain of sensation’.
My use of the haptic in figure ground, surface gaze and touch light is concerned 
with feeling this ‘affective supplement’, the affective remainder of the digital 
image. Chapter Two concluded its discussion of the impact of informatisation 
on the loss of the representational force of the image by emphasising that the 
political potential of the image may be found, not in its representations, but in 
the volatility of the informational flows in which it is enmeshed. This is what 
remains of the image for a visual activism that would seek to disrupt the visual 
operations of the society of control. My haptic photography seeks an 
immersion in these flows by being present with their tactile surfaces in the 
image, inviting a time-space of encounter with the interface, whose affective 
remainder is the feeling of its potential for indeterminacy. 
The intimacy of haptic visuality puts us in touch with the indeterminacy of the 
interface, whose contingency is a function of its dynamic condition, its volatile 
movements. In this sense, the contingency of the haptic is a direct counter to 
the instrumental touch incited by the circulation-image, ‘a mouse click, a 
keystroke, or a button press’ to quote Franklin (2015, 164) again. The image-
machine of control is tactile, but algorithmically so, with each touch of the 
screen helping to refine its modulations. 
By contrast, the haptic image can evoke the volatility of the interface, a sense 
of movement as creative potential, for ‘hapticity is also related to our sense of 
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mental motion, as well as to kinesthesis, or the ability of our bodies to sense the 
mutable existence of things and movement in space’ (Bruno 2015). Moholy-
Nagy’s (1947) work on Vision in Motion also evoked the sense of a ‘haptic 
unconscious, or the idea of a technologically based tactile experience of 
vision’ (Terranova 2012, 234). If, as Marks (2004, 82) insists, ‘[h]aptic images 
and haptic visuality, in order to have the kind of radical potential I saw in 
them, need to be motivated by something radical’, it is to their evocation of the 
unsettled movements of the interface that I look for such potential. The 
‘vibrating dissonance’ of these movements, to quote Willerslev and Suhr (2013, 
4) again, is the focus of my two video works, to which I turn next.
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5.4 Video work
5.4.1 Thresholds of interference: look screen
In look screen, I am concerned with the ‘virtuality of the tremble’ in the digital-
visual interface. The film begins with flow and ends with vibration. As an 
interface, the film is an encounter with looking, within the frame and out from 
the screen, evoking the superposition of looking that characterises the folded 
informational space of the image-machine, discussed at the end of Section 4.1. 
With look screen, I incorporate visual elements from my earlier photographic 
work, setting them into motion in order to unsettle their stasis and explore 
their flux. Images enfold each other in a montage, spatial rather than linear, 
whose duration becomes a space of de/formations. 
The film draws on my previous experiments with a haptic visuality to invite a 
looking that feels close(ly), challenging the controlling sight of optical distance. 
The touch invited by the haptic image is curious and contingent, a staying ‘in 
touch’ with the image in order to feel what it looks like. As with my 
photographic practice, reviewed in Section 5.3, the haptic quality of the 
imagery used in look screen pushes toward the edge of representation, exploring 
its limits while at the same time touching on the logic of abstraction 
underpinning algorithmic capitalism, whose informatisation the digital image 
nervously expresses.
Haptic imagery in look screen interrogates sight, the common sense of dominant 
(because distant) sense perception. I was interested in the ways in which close 
ups of the eye, which falls out of focus, could suggest a minoritarian sense 
perception, similar to the minor literature that Deleuze and Guattari (1986) 
identified in Kafka. As discussed in Chapter One, this kind of minoritarian 
artistic practice is interested in disrupting dominant codes of signification and 
representation through a stuttering and stammering with, in Kafka’s case, 
language. 
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This disruption works, as O’Sullivan (2012, 6) suggests, through ‘moments of 
noise – or glitches as we might call them’ that constitute a ‘rupturing of 
representation.’ O’Sullivan sees in this rupturing the potential to create the 
kinds of non-communication, which Deleuze saw as a means to ‘hijack speech’. 
He (Deleuze 1995a, 175) insisted that ‘[c]reating has always been something 
different from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of 
non-communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.’ 
As articulated by O’Sullivan (2012, 7), such circuit breakers can be produced 
by an ‘affective stammering’, which ‘operates as a kind of singularity that in 
itself counteracts already existing affective/signifying regimes, whilst at the 
same time, crucially, opening up a gap within these all too familiar series and 
circuits of knowledge/information.’ I see my use of haptic imagery as similarly 
opening up a gap in normative sense perception, whose vibrations in close up, 
expressed in the physical effort of holding the camera close to the object of 
sight for an extended period of time are, literally, a visual stammering which 
seeks to act as a circuit breaker in communicative flows. 
From my photographic experiments with fold and touch, I turned to video in 
order to investigate further this ‘stuttering’ of a minoritarian visuality, and in 
particular the ontology of the digital-visual interface as a sight and site of 
vibrational forces, ‘circuit breakers’ interrupting both the smooth flows and 
arresting stabilisations of the scopic regime of control. My interest in the 
vibrational ontology of the interface centres on the time-space it opens up to 
disrupt the workings of modulation, being the impressing of rhythms of 
circulation and capture, as well as patterns of fragmentation and aggregation, 
that constitute the operations of control. Digital video, as a durational medium, 
lends itself to this exploration of the time-space of the interface; as a moving 
image of discretised data, digital video is itself the ideal time-space in which to 
interrogate the intensive potential of the oscillations inherent in the relation 
between duration and instant, continuity and discontinuity.
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My approach to the making of look screen was influenced by the video 
compositions of James Richards, who has said of his work (Rittenbach 2013):
My working process has always begun with the idea of collage; of bringing 
disparate things together in such a way as to make something new, but also 
to keep hold of the sense of those fragments being very different—or from 
very different sources—each with a life of its own.
This arranging together of ‘disparate things’ recalls the generative potential of 
baroque folds discussed in Section 5.3.1. As Richards (Rittenbach 2013) 
suggests, ‘[t]hough my work deals a lot with the disjointed, the fragmented 
and the random, I feel I’m very much trying to make something expressive.’ 
Similarly, in look screen, I bring ‘disparate things together in such a way as to 
make something new’, expressive of dissonant rhythms that counter the 
affective anxiety and urgency of the circulation-image of control. I sought this 
dissonance, in part, through a temporal montage of visual fragments which 
move in and out of easy legibility, a movement of uncertain looking that invites 
an immersion in the digital-visual encounter itself, that is to say, the interface. 
The visual components of look screen are based on over 30 hours of video that I 
shot over the course of the PhD, in and around my home in Brooklyn and in 
several locations in Manhattan. My video image gathering was guided by the 
principle of looking ‘uncertainly’, whether using extreme close-ups to render 
strange the surfaces and textures of the city streets, screens and subway trains 
and platforms or by extended fixed frame shots of urban circulations, of people 
and vehicles, the contingency of whose movements across the frame I wanted 
to register. I was interested in the generative potential of ‘looking at looking’. 
In look screen we look at other screens, and other eyes, looking back at us, and 
thereby sense the time-space of ‘between faces’ that is a ‘facing between’. 
I also made extensive use of ‘wild sound’ to generate dissonant audio-visual 
rhythms. For Richards (Rittenbach 2013) too ‘it started in sound’ and his 
account of the role of the sonic in his compositional process was influential on 
my own video practice:
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I think a lot of the work in editing or composing a piece is in feeling out the 
internal rhythms of the footage that I’m using, and letting that guide the 
sound of a particular section and how I work it into the next.
With a debt to Pierre Schaeffer’s conception of musique concrète, in which he 
sought to take ‘sounds recorded from the natural or urban environment and 
strip them of their signifying power in order to produce a properly abstract 
music’ (Barry 2013), the soundtrack of look screen makes audible a sense of 
sonic ambiguity, in part by setting up audio-visual discordancies, splicing 
together the images from one video clip with the soundtrack from another. As 
Balsom (2017) notes when discussing Everson’s use of wild sound in his video 
Tonsler Park (2017), a portrait of workers at a polling station on November 8, 
2016, the ‘slight cleavage of image and sound ruptures any possible impression 
of total capture’ and thus constitutes a ‘refusal of mastery’ that ‘demands that 
we look nonetheless’. In this way, the dissonance of sound and image call 
attention to the interface of the digital-visual encounter itself.
On the soundtrack of look screen, the ring tone and its unanswered call, distant 
sirens in the city, subway noises and the machinic thrum that accompanies the 
folded montage of digital screens, are all used to induce an affective tone of 
uncertainty and anxiety. Will anyone answer the call? What danger do the 
sirens warn of? This affective tone is vibrational, for ‘[w]hat is edginess, 
nervousness, or the jitters if not the potential of vibrations to spiral into 
goalless, open-ended hyperactivity?’ asks Goodman (2012, 71). Set against this 
affect of anxiety, in dissonance with it, are the sounds of the everyday, people 
talking and walking, the flow of life. As discussed in Chapter One, with this 
everyday hum I invoke the spirit of resistance to control that de Certeau 
(1984) and Lefebvre (1991) among others found in the quotidian practice of 
life (Highmore 2002).
In this I was inspired by Conley’s (2002, 492) poetic acknowledgement that 
‘[m]eaning emerges from noise, from the murmur of the opaque folds of the 
world.’ My discordant use of sound was part of my broader strategy to 
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generate visual and sonic noise, as interference patterns to expose and explore 
the vibrational ontology of the interface, and the trembling virtuality of its data 
flows. Such interference patterns, as visual moiré, are often an artefact of 
images produced by digital imaging and computer graphics techniques, when 
differential resolutions and scanning produce a secondary and visually evident 
superimposed pattern, vibrating in relation to the original image. I found that 
slow motion video capture of a video signal on a large public digital screen (the 
so-called Big Screen in Manhattan), when re-screened on a computer monitor, 
produces such visual moiré. I was less interested in the representational 
content of the imagery being screened which, in effect, were randomly 
selected; I filmed whatever was being shown on the Big Screen on that day at 
that time. But I was drawn to the moiré patterns created, as a form of visual 
interference with smooth flows of visual communication.
Significantly, given my interest in and use of folded montage and haptic 
visuality to disrupt or elude the image-machine of control, the term ‘moiré’ 
refers back to a type of textile, whose rippled or ‘watered’ appearance is 
produced by pressing together layers of textile when wet, whose differential 
spacing of warp and weft threads then creates characteristic patterns when the 
layers dry together. The moiré patterns produced by digital visual artefacts 
carry within them a texture of folds that can be felt; digital moiré invites a 
getting in touch with a visuality that interferes with the circulations and 
modulations of control’s image-machine.
My use of digital moiré in look screen as a form of visual interference is, in the 
sense of the minoritarian visual practice discussed above, part of a broader 
effort, to misquote Deleuze, to ‘hijack visuality’ from its deployments within 
the image-machine of control. This emphasis on the use of creative media to 
interfere with the smooth operations of capitalism can be traced back to the 
strategies of détournement called for by the Situationist International from the 
late 1950s onwards (Debord 1970; Plant 1992; McDonough 2002; Rancière 
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2013), whose influence on recent and contemporary anticapitalist struggles, 
notably Occupy Wall St (McKee 2016), was briefly reviewed in Chapter Two. 
As a form of interference with the patterning of control, my use of moiré is 
more specifically grounded in the generation of a ‘noise’, whose vibrations 
disrupt the signaletic flows of capitalism. With the emergence of information 
theory (Shannon and Weaver 1963), and its understanding of information as 
signal, rather than signification, attention has been drawn to the problematic of 
noise, as already briefly reviewed in Section 5.2.3. In Terranova’s (2004, 15) 
useful summation, information theory posits that ‘[t]he information flow 
establishes a contact between sender and receiver by excluding all 
interference, that is by holding off noise.’ 
The impact of the digital on the loss of the image as a stable site of 
representational meaning, discussed in Chapter Two, is in part grounded in 
this shift from signification to signal. The visual operations of control, as 
Chapter Three made clear, are based on a similar signaletic logic, being 
conducted by the circulation-image, whose function is to accumulate and 
circulate ‘raw data for the machine’, the image-machine of control. 
But if information theory reduced visual and other forms of communication to 
the engineering problem of maximising signal-to-noise ratios, its unintended 
consequence has been to generate interest in the potential of ‘noise’ as a form 
of resistance, aimed at disrupting the smooth efficiency of the communication 
machine’ (Terranova 2004, 17). This view of resistance, as ‘what hinders and 
dissipates the energy flow of domination’, to quote Highmore (2002, 151) 
again on de Certeau’s (1984) understanding of everyday resistance, is what 
interests me. But in contrast to using ‘noise’ to interrupt the representational 
efficiency of the communication machine, my work has addressed the ‘noise’ 
inherent within the volatility of the interface itself. 
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Again, with reference back to television in Lazzarato’s (2002, 72, cited in 
Thomsen 2012) formulation, the digital image is ‘a living and dynamic field of 
energy, an oscillation that only seems fixed to the extent that it exceeds our 
capacity to a degree to perceive small units of time.’ My work with look screen 
exposes and plays with this oscillation as digital noise. The moiré patterns of 
look screen literally tremble, resonating with artefacts at the level of the pixel 
and its edges. If computationality’s logic of discretisation is based on a cutting 
into the flux of life to produce discrete ‘bits’ of information (and, in visual 
terms, discrete pixels of light encoded as information), echoing Bachelard’s 
(2000) insistence on the primacy of the instant as the basis of duration, then 
the trembling of digital moiré exposes the vibrational potential within such 
discretisation. 
In this way, look screen becomes an unsettling scene of digital flux, an openness 
to continuous variation usually taken to be the distinctive quality of the analog 
as opposed to the digital. ‘While the digital, it is argued, in its discrete binary 
constitution of bytes frames a predetermined, precoded field of demarcated 
possibility, can there not be a potential for mutation immanent to the numerical 
code itself?’ Goodman (2012, 122) asks. Parisi is clear about such potential. As 
Clough notes (2012), citing the work of Parisi (2009), this potential 
‘transform[s] the logic of binary states, yes and no, into the fuzzy states of 
maybes and perhaps’, such indeterminacies being ‘not merely qualitative 
renderings of a digital binarism,’ but instead to be understood in terms of new 
processes of quantification that recognise ‘the full densely packed zones of 
information that are the intensive surrounds of zero and one’; zones defined by 
‘an intrinsic numerical variability which remains computationally open.’
In their indeterminacy and instability, the moiré patterns of look screen interfere 
with the logic of control and its algorithmically ‘predetermined, precoded 
field[s] of demarcated possibility’. To adapt O’Sullivan’s (2012, 6) formulation, 
‘these moments of noise – or glitches as we might call them’ free computational 
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visuality ‘from itself, at least, from its signifying self, by putting it into contact 
with other forces.’ This interest in the glitch is a focus of ‘glitch aesthetics’ or 
‘new aesthetics’ (Berry et al. 2012; Sterling 2012). 
But instead of the cognitive dissonance, and therefore reassurance, that the 
‘new aesthetics’ discourse appears to emphasise (as in, ‘look, the digital image-
machine of control does not function perfectly’), what is interesting about the 
glitch as it is invoked by the kinds of becoming-art that Deleuze and Guattari 
identify in Kafka is the intensive potential of its affective quality. As O’Sullivan 
(2012, 6) emphasises:
We might say that the listener – or spectator – must respond to the glitch, 
the affective-event, as an event, as the bearer of the potentiality of 
something else. […] The glitch then, I would argue, is co-produced 
through object and subject – in fact, it names a passage between the two.
Might we see the glitch, then, less an exposure of the malfunctions of the 
image-machine of control, and more a resonant, affective encounter with the 
play, the room-for-manoeuvre, in the machine? And how might this room-for-
manoeuvre be experienced in the digital-visual interface? I see the interference 
patterns of digital moiré in look screen, through their vibrations, as helping to 
work loose the circuits of communicational flow, making room for leaks and 
seepages that may move us to see and experience the potential for the new.
5.4.2 Trembling virtuality: moving still
With moving still, I continue my investigation of the vibrational ontology of the 
interface. If the image-machine of control operates through its continuous 
modulation of data flows, the continual scene of this modulation is the 
turbulent potential of the digital-visual interface. In moving still, I use 
encounters between the still and moving image to form this turbulent interface, 
its instability being its potential for the new. Through extended dissolves, the 
film mixes still and moving images to create a continual flux at the surface of 
the screen: nothing seems settled. Bergson (2004, 28) wrote of the imagistic 
flow constituting matter that ‘[r]epresentation is there, but always virtual - 
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being neutralized, at the very moment when it might become actual, by the 
obligation to continue itself and to lose itself in something else.’ This is the 
tremble of virtuality in the interface; the settled image, as an actuality, is lost in 
the glare of light from the imagistic flow, as soon as it appears.
An unsettled screen, a sense of stillness moving or movement being recurrently 
stalled, is unsettling. Hito Steyerl’s ‘still’ video piece Red Alert (2007), a new 
media remake of Rodchenko’s red-yellow-blue triptych, was one inspiration 
for moving still. As Lütticken (2013, 82) notes, ‘the piece contains no moving 
images, and yet, as video, it remains a time-image - demonstrating the diffusion 
of such terror alerts, little mini-shocks in their own right, in the time of life.’ A 
second significant influence was the film work of photographer John Stezaker. 
In Horse (2012), Stezaker uses near-identical pictures from many editions of a 
racehorse catalogue over the past 30 years, to create a film of an apparently 
nervous racehorse that cannot keep still. His Crowd (2013) is composed entirely 
of film stills of crowd scenes from movies. ‘These “still” films are anything but 
motionless’, notes Cumming (2015). The result is an unsettling visual 
experience. ‘The eye is baffled, and so is the brain’, Cumming (2015) observes.
But it is also generative, as Cumming (2015) continues:
For strangest of all, in the end, is the curious stillness to which these films 
revert. […] They are meant to spark thoughts and so they do, these objects 
of contemplation that hover in the air like humming birds moving at 
superhuman speed.
I was similarly interested in this ‘curious stillness’ of movement, and its 
potential to provoke a sense of the new or unexpected, but at a very different 
rhythm to Stezaker’s ‘superhuman speed’. Accelerating speed has become a 
defining characteristic of computational capitalism; the image-machine of 
control operates with an urgently anxious tempo. The use of extreme slow 
motion, for example in the video work of Bill Viola and Douglas Gordon, as an 
aesthetic interruption of this tempo, creating a caesura within which to 
experience a temporality outside of capitalism’s accelerationist imperative, was 
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briefly reviewed in Chapter Four. Hansen’s (2004) insight concerning the 
‘affective supplement’ of temporal experience below/beyond the threshold of 
conscious perception, generated by this use of severe slow motion, heightened 
my interest in the generative potential of slowness, approaching stillness, in the 
moving image.
This affective supplement aroused by a ‘decelerationist’ aesthetics may have a 
range of emotional tonality. In his account of Wendelien van Oldenborgh’s 
slow motion blending and fading of film stills projected over each other, 
Lütticken (2013, 67) notes that ‘the viewer-listener becomes suspicious and 
somewhat irritated’ as the ‘[i]ndustrial sequential order is transformed into a 
curiously meandering time. Instead of producing an abstract negation of 
measured time, the piece stretches and dilates it.’ It is the ‘radically creative’ 
potential of dilating time in which moving still is interested.
My work on moving still was influenced by Koepnick’s (2014, 9) elaboration of 
her concept of ‘aesthetic slowness’, which ‘makes us pause and hesitate, not to 
put things to rest and to obstruct the future, but to experience the changing 
landscapes of the present in all their temporal multiplicity.’ Given that ‘the 
central challenge is to think of the present as a space of multiple trajectories 
and possibilities’ (Koepnick 2014, 12), then the radical potential of aesthetic 
slowness, Koepnick (2014, 14) suggests, is:
the promise of contingency—freedom, indeterminism, surprise, and wonder
—while challenging how today’s culture of speed, ubiquitous computing, 
and neoliberal deregulation has appropriated contingency as one of its 
primary ideological building blocks, as part of a new language of 
inevitability.
Crucially, this promise is premised not on a simple inversion of speed into 
slowness, but an aesthetic exploration of multiple temporalities and rhythms. 
‘[A]esthetic slowness wants us to explore modes of mobility and perception 
that do not simply reverse—and thus surreptitiously reaffirm—what is seen as 
the dominant regime of speed’ Koepnick (2014, 6) emphasises.
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With moving still, I use extremely slow dissolves between still images, and 
between still and moving images, to create an experience of the digital-visual 
interface as an unsettled flux. Its vibrational quality is ‘the promise of 
contingency’, an evocation of a reality always in process and never fixed, 
calling attention to ‘the experience of being in time’, and the creative potential 
that Bergson (2004) saw as inhering within this experience. There are three 
sequences of flux in moving still, expressing the unsettled interface in its 
continually changing form. 
As with my other work, the imagery used in moving still was ‘taken’ at different 
times throughout the course of my doctoral work. The first sequence uses 
dissolves between a video clip and photograph of the same face on fence-
mounted mural celebrating the diversity of the Lower East Side. Drawn by my 
interest in challenging the faciality of the gaze, I returned to this scene on 
several occasions, sometimes shooting video and sometimes taking 
photographs. If the content of this first sequence reflects my theorising of the 
‘faciality system’, and in its particular choice of facial imagery gestures toward 
the returned gaze of the visually marginalised non-white subject, my primary 
impulse, aesthetically and politically, was non-representational. This is to say, 
that whatever the circumstances and intentions of their original ‘capture’, my 
evolving interest in the fluid dynamics of the interface as a time-space of 
unstable data flows led me to use these still and moving images, together, to 
create such an interface. In moving still, I seek not a representation of an 
interface but an immersion in the spatio-temporality of its contingency.
Similarly, in the second sequence of moving still, I re-purpose two of the haptic 
images that I use in touch light as a further visual expression of the interface as 
vibrational flux. When viewed together, as elements of interfaces of resistance, 
these video and photographic works thus reference each other, co-constituting 
the contingencies of the interface in their resonant hapticity and vibration. The 
final sequence dissolves between two images of an electronic ‘wanted’ sign 
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used by the New York Police Department, in this instance alerting the public 
that a young black male was a suspect in a crime of sexual assault. 
Once again, my choice of imagery reflects my political interest in the visual 
apparatus of social control, in this instance gesturing towards its racist ‘vision’. 
But my deployment of this imagery in moving still is less to do with exposing 
this vision, and more concerned with the vibrational experience of the interface 
as an interruption that ‘makes us pause and hesitate’ amid the circulations of 
the image-machine of control. That this image-machine is indeed racist is 
merely, if meaningfully, glimpsed as the second image of the pair used in the 
sequence resolves into clarity. As an experience of the ‘virtuality of the 
tremble’, the unsettled interface of moving still ‘stresses the extent to which the 
virtual is deeply embedded in what we call and perceive as the real’ (Koepnick 
2014, 14).
Sound also plays an important function in generating both a sense of the 
unsettled vibration of the real and a unity in multiplicity across the three 
sequences of visual flux. To create the machinic hum of the soundtrack, I 
sourced wild sound from the streets and subways of New York City, then 
slowed the audio track down and applied a low pass filter to accentuate its bass 
frequencies. Goodman (2012) associates bass frequencies with forms of 
acoustic resistance to the sonic modulations deployed by control societies. He 
(Goodman 2012, 188) contrasts the higher frequencies that ‘abduct consumers 
immersed in both the transensory and non sensory soup of vibro-capitalism’ 
with the ‘messy, leaky, low frequencies with an affinity to hapticity, immersion, 
and congregation’ (Goodman 2012, 187). With vibrating image and bass 
thrum, moving still invites an immersion in the ‘seeping edge of the virtual’ and 
its potential for the new.
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5.5 A practice of resistance
I began my creative practice with a desire to use visual media to explore what 
control cannot control, the leaks and stains of its remainder. This is the 
potential for resistance that remains with the digital image. To get a sense of 
the openings for the new within the closed circuits of the image-machine of 
control, I have immersed my practice in the digital-visual interface, in whose 
trembling turbulence this potential may be felt. My practice has ranged from 
the explorations of the fold through photomontage to the use of haptic imagery 
to feel the smooth space of the interface, to the setting up of interference 
patterns and visual and sonic vibrations in my video work. In these ways, I 
have engaged with the dynamic threshold condition of the interface as the 
moment-site for an experience of rhythms that counter the insistent anxieties 
of the circulation-image. 
As a time-space of forming, rather than a relation between pre-existing forms, 
the interface is an opportunity to keep open the process of forming and the 
question of what is being formed. My photographic and video work has sought 
to stay present with both this process and this question. Such presence makes 
possible, to refer back to Massumi (1995, 105), ‘a pragmatic understanding of 
emergence’ which can ‘enable triggerings of change’. When we feel its tremble, 
the interface may become an intensive site and sight of this emergence, 
releasing energies for change.
The presentation of my creative practice on the blogging platform Tumblr 
grounds its claim to be a site and sight of emergence. Tumblr, with a self-
declared 355.6 million blogs and 150.8 billion posts in 18 languages, invites 
you to ‘follow the world’s creators’ (Tumblr 2017). An incitement to circulation 
is Tumblr’s brand, and its commercial logic; ‘Tumblr lets you effortlessly share 
anything […] wherever you happen to be’ the platform announces (Tumblr 
2017). With this location, my work situates itself amid the digital-visual 
infrastructure of circulation that I have termed the image-machine of control.
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Key to the platform’s spectacular growth since its creation in 2007 has been its 
emphasis on user control. Recalling his frustration with existing tools for 
sharing user-generated content on the internet at the time he created Tumblr, 
including WordPress and Blogger for text, Flickr for photos and YouTube for 
videos, David Karp emphasised that he ‘was perfectly happy with all these 
tools but at the same time, constantly frustrated by the limitations imposed by 
all of them’ (Alfonso 2013). Such limitations persist. Photo sharing platforms 
Instagram and Flickr both allow the sharing of video clips but severely limit 
their length, to 60 seconds in the case of the former and three minutes for the 
latter. Video sharing sites such as You Tube or Vimeo are not designed to 
display portfolios of still images.
By contrast, Tumblr claims to be a limitless platform, as expressed in its 
insistence that ‘[y]ou can customize everything’ (Tumblr 2017). This flexibility 
accorded well with my transmedial interest in presenting a body of work, 
combining both photography and video, that could engage with the flows and 
captures of the image-machine of control and explore the emergence of the 
new within the moving stillness of the interface. Equally, Tumblr is a 
proprietary platform that ‘encloses’, and thereby monetises, the storage and 
distribution of users’ creativity through the allure of creating a commons for 
unlimited sharing. Its business model, then, is premised on Kember’s (2012) 
insight that, in the age of both ubiquitous computation and pervasive image-
making, our image apps and digital screens ‘contribute to the reordering of us 
as prosuming subjects becoming data objects for markets’. On Tumblr, we may 
discern ‘our emergent status as precisely the sort of embodied informational 
agents that serve us, then, in a double sense, transforming as they reinforce us, 
serving us – up’ (Kember 2012).
Tumblr, as a platform, is paradigmatic of the image-machine of control. In May 
2011, James Bridle (2011) used Tumblr to launch an ongoing research project 
into ‘artefacts of the heterogeneous network’, which point ‘towards new ways 
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of seeing the world, an echo of the society, technology, politics and people that 
co-produce them.’ He termed this project the New Aesthetic, ‘a cascade of 
images, a collection, an archive, or more specifically, a database that attempts 
to document a certain unfolding condition’ (Berry et al. 2012). This condition 
is marked, Sterling (2012) suggests, by the ‘eruption of the digital in the 
physical’. For Berry and his co-authors (2012, 41), the ‘New Aesthetic, then, 
can be understood as a comportment towards “seeing” computation, 
responding to it, or merely being correctly attuned to it.’
That this comportment be critical is clearly important. ‘Part of the challenge 
for citizens of a regime of computation is to bring the digital (code/software) 
back into visibility for exploration, research and cultural critique’ notes Berry 
(2012, 44). Such visibility would make clear that (POSZU 2012):
The New Aesthetic reeks of power relations. Drones, surveillance, media, 
networks, digital photography, algorithms. This is largely about the 
technology of “seeing”, and how we see this new technology of seeing. But 
the technology is also for watching. The ability to watch someone is a form 
of power. It controls the flow of information.
Yet the New Aesthetic Tumblr itself has been taken to task for a certain 
political naivety when it comes to confronting such power relations, its 
criticality undermined by a fascination with the surface effects of the eruption 
of the digital into the realm of the visual on our screens. 
For Berry and his co-authors (2012), this kind of ‘screen essentialism’ flattens 
both analysis and critique by neglecting the layers and complexities of code 
and computational infrastructure ‘beneath’ and ‘beyond’ the screen and their 
ramifying cultural and political effects. They (Berry et al. 2012, 62-63) 
conclude that:
Tumblrs, and related collection-oriented computational systems certainly 
contribute to visualizing forms of understanding, through the generation of 
geometric and photographic truths manifested in painted screens and 
surfaces. However, there is still important critical and creative work to be 
done to fully confront this reality of 21st century visual culture, one that is 
computationally mediated and saturated with consumerism and markets.
 109
Tumblr then provides an appropriate setting for my ‘critical and creative’ 
response to the digital visuality of control. Based on my theorisation of the 
circulation-image and its functions within the image-machine of control, this 
response centres on the interface as a site/sight of critical comportment toward 
the computational conditions of the image-machine, and I use video and 
photographic work on Tumblr at https://interfaces-of-resistance.tumblr.com to 
constitute a set of interfaces as a practice of resistance to such control. 
Here, the two video pieces and four photography portfolios, which together 
constitute the mixed media work interfaces of resistance in the image-machine of 
control, are presented. This visual work is accompanied by an opening text that 
frames, theoretically and politically, its intention and production. Each of the 
six pieces also has its own very brief framing text, including technical 
production details. For the videos there are two points of user interaction, 
namely the play button and expand button. The photography ‘windows’ are set 
to ‘slideshow’, meaning that the still images are in episodic motion. Clicking on 
the image takes the viewer into an enlarged, user-controlled slideshow, 
presenting an arrested flow of images that requires the viewer to activate into 
movement by clicking on the screen.
The frames within frames of interfaces of resistance become a digital-visual 
interface when the user interacts with the screen. But crucially this 
interactivity is limited to activating the interface. All other sharing functions 
provided by Tumblr, notably the ‘reblog’ and ‘like’ buttons, have been switched 
off. Presenting interfaces of resistance as a Tumblr blog customised in this way 
turns the platform against itself, using its affordance of user control to operate 
against its incitement to further circulation. When the interfaces of medium 
specific, surface gaze, figure ground, touch light, look screen and moving still are 
activated, they become a site-moment of pause, hesitation even, within which 
to sense ‘the promise of contingency—freedom, indeterminism, surprise, and 
wonder’, to quote Koepnick (2014, 14) again.
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As an invitation to pause rather than incitement to circulate, interfaces of 
resistance, inspired by Flusser (2000, 2011), ‘plays against’ the image-machine 
of control, though not at the level of the image and its representations but 
rather in terms of the data flows of imagistic circulation. This is the ‘resistance’ 
politics of interfaces of resistance, to be found in its commitment to playing 
against the socio-technical conditions that both make the work possible and 
that constitute the operations of the image-machine of control. For, as 
Lütticken (2013, 234) suggests, ‘the aesthetic project at its most apposite is a 
problematization of artistic autonomy that is, at least potentially, also a 
politicization.’ The politico-aesthetics of interfaces of resistance are that it is both 
component and critique of the image-machine, necessarily impure, 
foregrounding ‘its own status as a questionable thing’, and ‘demanding a 
constant renegotiation of autonomy and heteronomy’ (Lütticken 2013, 234).
This renegotiation is ever more pressing in the contemporary ‘“gamified” 
cultural economy’ Lütticken (2013, 159) suggests, ‘in which work increasingly 
becomes “creative,” (2013, 54) and is ‘marked by the inability to distinguish 
between labor and leisure, between work and occupation, between working 
hours and free time - between performance and life’ (2013, 195). The scene of 
this real subsumption of life by capitalism is increasingly the digital screen. In 
the image-machine, the viewer-as-worker learns to play, not as a ludic but as a 
cybernetic practice. Digital screens, to adapt Steyerl’s (2017, 106) critique of 
computer games, ‘are not only playgrounds for free choice, but also training 
grounds for habits. They rehearse certain response patterns and create muscle 
memory.’ As Lütticken (2013, 159) laments, is ‘there even a subject behind 
these acts, or just a distended subjectivity modulated by the flow of images?’ 
The dilation of such flows, opening up the digital-visual interface to the 
contingencies of its folds and haptically smooth space, its interference patterns 
and visual and sonic vibrations, is an opening of an ‘outside’ inside the image-
machine that I see as my form of visual resistance. 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6. Conclusion: What Moves Us Still
What does resistance look like in the era of ubiquitous computation? How 
does control work on and through the digital screen, and what does this mean 
for the kinds of visual activism called for by Mirzoeff (2016, 293), ‘the 
interaction of pixels and actions to make change’? These are the questions that 
have animated my creative practice, and moved me to investigate the interface 
and its vibrations as a time-space of disrupting the visual operations of control. 
If the screen is the scene of a patterning of light whose affective force incites 
an interactivity to augment and sustain the data flows of informational 
capitalism, then the interface as the turbulent encounter of, and with, these 
flows can be seen as an uncertain event, a vibrational moment rather than 
temporary stabilisation, whose resonances may yet move us to ‘actions to make 
change.’
The modal form of this conclusion is instructive, for the question of agency, as 
the will and capacity for action, shadows the political concerns and desires of 
my creative work. A thesis whose questions were formulated as Zucotti Park 
near Wall St was being occupied, in the name of the 99 percent reclaiming 
their agency from capitalism’s plutocracy, reaches its conclusion in the summer 
of Trump, whose racist populism and cult of the strong leader is, in effect, a 
negation of everything that the Occupy movement appeared to represent. This 
is to say that my creative work, to which I looked in order to release my own 
sense of blocked agency, has been undertaken during an extended political 
‘moment’ of deepening crisis for the progressive Left. 
When ‘take back control’ (‘of our country’, ‘of our borders’) becomes a 
dominant meme of politics, the urgency of confronting the operations of 
control is not only ever more pressing but ever more challenging, not least 
artistically. As Goodman (2012, 194) says, it ‘is essential, therefore, to get 
things in perspective.’ In paying attention to the the micropolitics of frequency 
as he calls it, Goodman (2012, 194) warns against ‘grand claims regarding the 
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spontaneous politicality of the so-called emergent creativity of the multitude.’ 
For as he (Goodman 2012, 194) emphasises, ‘[e]xperiments with responses to 
frequencies, textures, rhythms, and amplitudes render the divergence of 
control and becoming ever diminishing.’
There is a broader context too with respect to the movement of my creative 
work in response to the digital visuality of control, and that is the real 
subsumption of the visual by computational capitalism, identified by Franklin 
(2011), which itself can be linked to the subsumption of art as a neoliberal 
aesthetic (Bishop 2012; Osborne 2013; McKee 2016). I can do no more than 
gesture to this here, but such a context is significant when it comes to 
reflecting on my creative process and, for want of a less grand term, my 
political progress. As Ngai (2005, 3) concludes, in her wonderful account of 
the ugly feelings seemingly associated with artistic production in the midst of 
neoliberal capitalism:
The evidence here would suggest that the very effort of thinking the 
aesthetic and political together - a task whose urgency seems to increase in 
proportion to its difficulty in a increasingly anti-utopian and functionally 
differentiated society - is a prime occasion for ugly feelings.
Her discussion of these ugly feelings, among them envy, anxiety, paranoia and 
irritation, is concerned with the ‘negative affects that read the predicaments 
posed by a general state of obstructed agency with respect to other human 
actors or to the social as such’; in other words, ‘situations of passivity’ (Ngai 
2005, 3). Crucially, these ‘dysphoric affects often seem to be the psychic fuel 
on which capitalist society runs’ (Ngai 2005, 3).
As Bishop (2016) notes, in her critique of the ideology of art as social practice 
which has characterised much artistic production in the era of neoliberalism, 
‘[i]n retrospect, it does seem that so much art of the 2000s […] was suffused in 
melancholic resignation resulting from the failed anti-war protests of 2003, the 
unstoppable march of neoliberalism, and a sense of political impasse.’ My own 
ugly feelings of ‘obstructed agency’, then, which prompted my turn to visual 
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forms of creative expression to engage with the problems of control in the first 
place, have themselves risked being heightened in the ‘situations of passivity’ 
induced by the real subsumption of visuality and aesthetics, and the ‘ugly’ 
rightward turn of politics in recent years. At the same time, I am aware that in 
pushing my photographic and video work to the ‘edge of representation’, I am 
doing so from a privileged positioning in hierarchies (of gender, race, sexuality 
and class) in which the question of ‘feeling represented’ has never arisen. And 
this during a political moment when the Black Lives Matter movement has 
insisted on visibility and self-representation as among its most urgent political 
energies for those who are not only discarded but assassinated by the ‘system’.
Compounding the feelings of ‘obstructed agency’ are those of political 
irrelevance, if not counter-productivity. What does it mean to embrace a 
visuality of abstraction, itself the operation of capitalism, at a time when the 
claims for dignity and humanity through self-representation by those denied it 
are being made with renewed vigour? Mirzoeff (2017), in relation to whose 
proposal for a renewal of visual activism I have situated my own practice, 
continues to insist on a reclaiming of representation, and in his most recent 
work highlights the importance of creating spaces for envisioned liberation, 
spaces ‘where we catch a glimpse of the society that is to come.’ As he 
(Mirzoeff 2017) urges:
I want a space in which to appear—whether an institution or public space—
that doesn't reproduce white supremacy, that doesn't represent a prison, in 
which there isn't expropriated labor, there isn't extinction, and there isn't 
genocide. What would that look like?
Balsom reminds us that ‘before romanticizing the escape of invisibility, we 
must remember that to be invisible is also to be cast out of the body politic, 
into the precariousness of ungrievable life.’ She (Balsom 2017, italics in 
original) calls for a return to visual practices that enable ‘a form of thinking with 
appearances that depends simultaneously on the image’s ties to phenomenal 
reality and the image’s differences from it.’ ‘The appearances of the world need 
our care more than our suspicion’, she (Balsom 2017) insists.
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Such calls for a return to representation, whether representing the world as it 
is or the world as it could be, take place within a larger context of artistic 
activism unleashed, in part, by the Occupy movement. A thorough review of 
the complex reordering of relations between art and activism in the six years 
since the Zucotti park occupation is beyond the scope of my own project. But 
what the extensive literature on this reordering suggests is that art’s liberatory 
potential persists (McKee 2016; Sholette 2016; Shukaitis 2016; Thompson 
2015; Roberts 2015; Léger 2013; Demos 2013; Mitchell et al. 2013). 
Assessments of where this potential is to be found differ, but McKee (2016, 
238) is persuasive in his insistence that artistic practices be embedded in the 
‘living fabric of collective political struggle’.
I see my own practice as a strand of this ‘living fabric’, albeit one with a 
different texture to the politically declarative and counter-representational 
visual activism that has characterised political struggle in the post-Occupy era. 
For such activism and its radical deployments of the image must reckon with 
the computational ontology of the image and its functions within an 
infrastructure of data aggregation and analysis, whose imperatives are 
corporate profit and state control. For Berlant (2016, 393), ‘infrastructure is 
defined by the movement or patterning of social form. It is the living mediation 
of what organizes life: the lifeworld of structure.’ The image-machine, being 
the infrastructure that organises any digitally-based visual activism, is the 
lifeworld of contemporary social control, whose movements and patternings of 
data expose the limits of visual-political representation. Not only has 
informatisation rendered the workings of power less representable than ever, it 
has also unsettled the subject positions on which political claims to 
representation have long rested.
My visual practice, then, as a form of resistance to the operations of control, 
has looked not to representation as the site of struggle, but to circulation, and 
the unstable movements within the image-machine itself. Between the subject-
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object positions that conventionally characterise relations of the image, 
between the looking subject and looked-at screen, is the digital-visual interface 
as contingent boundary condition. Experiencing this boundary condition is to 
sense not only the insistent demands of the circulation-image which lures us as 
visual subjects to interact with visual objects (by clicking, swiping and tapping 
the screen) in order to keep the data moving. It is to feel also the openness and 
indeterminacy of the interface itself, its generative potential.
In the image-machine of control, operating through the circulation and capture 
of data, the interface is a time-space where this rhythm of circulation and 
capture is necessarily unstable, susceptible to arrhythmic vibrations and 
patterns. I have worked to generate such vibrations and patterns, in part 
through the folds of photomontage to slow down the tempo of the circulation-
image of control and through the haptic qualities of close-up photography to 
get in touch with the smooth space of the interface and its potential for 
deterritorialised looking. My creative practice has also worked with the 
interference patterns of video and vibrational forces of sound to set up 
counter-rhythms that resonate, not with capitalism’s imperative to circulate 
and capture, but with a moving stillness that vibrates with the potential of 
other movements, other directions. I have sought different resonances at the 
digital-visual interface that may yet release energies for change.
The interface is a super-positioning, in which everything is moving, unsettling 
my own positions of privilege as much as the claims to representation based on 
identitarian positions that are themselves vulnerable to control’s capture. 
Through this sense of super-positioning, the vibrational politics of the interface 
unsettles the fixity of position and reliability of movement tracking on which 
control relies, and on which its self-image as ‘being in control’ is predicated. If 
the political task remains to not merely see the world differently but to act to 
change it, the interface as that which still moves is an unsettling, and thus 
useful, place to start. 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